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CAN APPLES BE COMPARED TO ORANGES?  
A POLICY-BASED APPROACH FOR DECIDING 
WHETHER INTENTIONAL TORTS SHOULD BE 
INCLUDED IN COMPARATIVE FAULT 
ANALYSIS  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Suppose a man is sued civilly for raping a woman.1  Suppose further 
that the State with jurisdiction over this matter allows intentional torts to 
be compared with negligent acts when allocating liability under 
comparative fault.2  During the proceedings, the defendant alleges that 
the victim behaved negligently by dressing suggestively and not taking 
reasonable precautions for her own safety.3  Should the defendant be 
allowed to shift liability to the plaintiff for her negligence? 
Providing one answer to the foregoing question, Justice Daniel 
Stewart of the Utah Supreme Court concluded the following: 
Comparing a defendant’s negligence and a rapist’s 
intentional tort results in an absurdity; it is a comparison 
of unlikes, of apples and oranges. . . .  The legal 
obligation not to assault or rape is absolute.  The law 
does not impose on a victim a duty to avoid a criminal 
act by another.4 
The State in the hypothetical allows comparisons between the 
intentional and negligent acts of the parties.  Consequently, if the fact 
finder decides that the plaintiff was negligent for failing to protect 
herself, the defendant would be able to reduce his liability by the 
plaintiff’s percentage of fault.  Although this may seem harsh in its 
result, some states have adopted similar approaches.5 
                                                 
1 See Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1998) (Stewart, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (discussing this hypothetical to illustrate problems of comparing 
intentional and negligent torts when allocating fault among parties in a lawsuit). 
2 See infra note 77 and accompanying text (listing the states that do allow intentional 
torts in their comparative fault schemes). 
3 See Field, 952 P.2d at 1083. 
4 Id. at 1088. 
5 See Comeau v. Lucas, 455 N.Y.S.2d 871 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (permitting a defendant 
that was sued for assault to reduce his liability by the plaintiff’s negligence of drinking and 
engaging in disruptive behavior); see also Blazovich v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222 (N.J. 1991) 
(reducing the liability of a group of defendants who physically assaulted and battered the 
plaintiff by the plaintiff’s provocation and disruptive behavior). 
Fox: Can Apples Be Compared to Oranges? A Policy-Based Approach for De
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
262 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
Now consider the same facts and jurisdiction as before, except that 
the negligent party is a co-defendant.6  Defendant A is the rapist who 
committed the intentional act, and Defendant B is the owner of the 
publicly accessible property where the rape took place.7  If the fact finder 
finds that the owner is negligent for not providing enough security and 
lighting on the property, should the rapist be able to reduce his liability 
in an amount equivalent to the property owner’s negligence? 
Justice Rosalie E. Wahl of the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that 
in such a situation, the intentional tortfeasor should not be able to shift 
any of his liability.8  She stated that, “[w]here society wants certain 
conduct absolutely prohibited and discouraged,” such as intentional 
assaults, “apportionment of fault is not appropriate.”9  Notwithstanding 
this position, once again, the rapist in the hypothetical presented above 
would be able to reduce his liability by the owner’s negligence because 
the jurisdiction allows comparisons between negligent and intentional 
torts.  Is this a fair and just result?  Furthermore, what if the rapist is an 
unknown party or is insolvent, leaving only the owner of the property 
available to pay the plaintiff’s damages?  If the fact finder decides that 
both defendants are at fault, should the owner be responsible for the 
entire amount of damages or only his percentage of attributable fault? 
The purpose of this Note is to answer these hypothetical questions 
by creating an analytical framework from which to view various policy 
goals of tort law.  Accordingly, Part II provides background information 
for understanding this issue by discussing its common law roots,10 the 
expansion and progression of pertinent legal principles,11 and various 
attempts throughout history to uniformly approach this issue.12  Part III 
explores several modern policy goals of tort law helpful for analyzing 
whether to include intentional torts when applying the doctrine of 
comparative fault.13  Part IV proposes a model statute that prohibits 
                                                 
6 See Field, 952 P.2d at 1079 (Utah 1998) (detailing the facts of the case as the rape of the 
plaintiff on the property of the defendants being sued for negligence).  
7 See id. (describing a parallel fact pattern as the issue in the case with respect to the 
defendants). 
8 See Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 1986) (holding that the fraud of the 
defendant could not be reduced by the plaintiff’s negligence). 
9 Id. at 175–76. 
10 See infra Part II.A (chronicling the common law heritage of comparative negligence 
and how it has expanded beyond solely negligence claims in some states). 
11 See infra Part II.B (describing the varying approaches adopted by different states 
throughout the country). 
12 See infra Part II.C (detailing where the Uniform Comparative Fault Act and the 
Restatement stand on this issue). 
13 See infra Part III (analyzing the issue of including intentional torts using Johnson and 
Gunn’s list of tort policy goals as a framework). 
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comparisons between intentional and negligent torts.14  Finally, Part V 
offers a brief conclusion as to why intentional torts should not be 
included in states’ comparative fault schemes.15 
II.  BACKGROUND 
One of the primary functions of tort law is to compensate victims for 
damages resulting from another’s wrongdoing.16  Indeed some scholars 
argue that this is the highest priority in a tort law system.17  Criminal law 
seeks to remedy offenses against the public at large, and tort law 
provides individual relief to plaintiffs for personal losses suffered for 
which criminal law provides no remedy.18  This creates tension, 
                                                 
14 See infra Part VI (constructing a model statute that draws distinct lines between 
intentional misconduct and negligent acts, and precludes any comparisons between the 
two). 
15 See infra Part V (summarizing the conclusions of this Note regarding why intentional 
torts should not be included in comparative fault). 
16 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979).  The Restatement states the 
following as the primary purposes of tort law: 
The rules for determining the measure of damages in tort are based 
upon the purposes for which actions of tort are maintainable.  These 
purposes are: 
(a)  to give compensation, indemnity or restitution for harms; 
(b)  to determine rights; 
(c)  to punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct; and 
(d)  to vindicate parties and deter retaliation or violent and unlawful 
self-help. 
Id. 
17 See Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 
585 (March 2003) (arguing that the main drive of tort law is victim compensation, and this 
notion is supported by important legal authority, such as the Restatement of Torts).  In this 
article, Geistfeld describes what he calls the “compensatory norm” of understanding tort 
law.  Id. at 587.  He states that this is defined as “one's security interests over another’s 
liberty interests . . . .”  Id.  He explains that, “[i]n light of that priority, the tort system must 
adequately protect physical security while allowing risky behavior.”  Id.  As a result, this 
priority implies that for any risky interaction between two people, “the potential ‘victim’ is 
the party facing a threat to her physical security, whereas the potential ‘injurer’ is the one 
whose exercise of liberty creates that threat.”  Id. at 587-88.  Before performing the risky act 
in the ideal situation, the potential injurer would get the potential victim’s consent and the 
potential victim would agree to assume the risk only if she was fully compensated.  Id.  
However, because consensual risky interactions are not ordinarily feasible, tort law exists 
to provide compensation for the nonconsensual risks that result in injury.  Id. 
18 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 7 (5th ed. 
1984) (stating that torts are commenced and maintained by injured persons to be 
compensated for the damages they have suffered at the expense of a wrongdoer).  
However, these authors later suggest that, “[i]t is perhaps more accurate to describe the 
primary function as one of determining when compensation is to be required.”  Id. at 20.  
Because “[c]ourts leave a loss where it is[,] unless they find good reason to shift it[,]” tort 
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however, because a court will compensate a victim only when it finds a 
good reason to do so, such as when fault can be attributed to a 
defendant.19  Nevertheless, the need for victim compensation remains an 
ever-present drive of the American tort system.20 
This goal, to remedy a victim’s injuries, underlies the three bases of 
tort liability:  intentional misconduct, negligence, and strict liability.21  
Traditionally courts have treated these bases separately and distinctly.22  
But many courts struggle to maintain firm barriers because each of these 
three bases overlaps and runs into the others.23  One such situation has 
arisen in the context of comparative fault and whether it applies to 
intentional torts.24  Where comparative analysis was once reserved for 
only negligent acts, some states are now expanding the reach of their 
systems to include other forms of misconduct.25  The effects of these 
reforms on plaintiff recovery can be significant in scope.26 
To more fully illustrate the issues created by including intentional 
torts in comparative fault analysis, a review of how comparative fault 
developed and expanded is warranted.  Therefore, Part II.A of this Note 
chronicles the common law roots of comparative fault and its expansion 
beyond negligence.27  Second, Part II.B describes how comparative fault 
                                                                                                             
law will not compensate a victim unless there is first a showing of fault or some other form 
of liability.  Id. 
19 Id. at 20 (stating that “[c]ourts leave a loss where it is[,] unless they find good reason 
to shift it.”). 
20 Id. at 6 (explaining that the purpose of tort law is to adjust the losses arising out of 
human activities to provide compensation to injured persons harmed by the conduct of 
another). 
21 VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 2-2 (1994).  More specifically, the 
three bases of liability can be characterized as: 
1.  Intent of the defendant to interfere with the plaintiff’s interests.  
2.  Negligence. 
3.  Strict liability, or liability “without fault,” where the defendant is 
held liable in absence of any intent which the law finds wrongful,or 
any negligence. 
Id.  See also Geistfeld, supra note 17, at 585 (arguing that tort law exists to compensate 
victims of accidents and injury). 
22 See infra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the states that refuse to compare 
torts from these different spheres). 
23 See infra Part II.B (discussing the struggle that states are faced with in fashioning laws 
to either include intentional torts into, or exclude them from, their comparative fault 
schemes). 
24 See id. 
25 See infra Part II.B (listing and discussing the different approaches to comparative fault 
by the states). 
26 See infra Part III.B (analyzing how including intentional torts results in plaintiffs being 
denied adequate and equitable compensation for their injuries). 
27 See infra Part II.A (discussing contributory negligence and its development into 
modern-day comparative fault). 
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exists in individual states and how it has been addressed in view of 
intentional misconduct.28  Third, Part II.C briefly reviews prior attempts 
to bring uniformity to this issue.29  Finally, Part II.D provides a list of 
important public policy goals inherent in tort law that help in deciding 
whether intentional torts should be included in states’ comparative fault 
schemes.30 
A. From Contributory Negligence to Comparative Fault 
The common law dealt harshly with plaintiffs who played any part 
in causing their own injuries.31  Under the common law, if a plaintiff’s 
own negligence contributed to his injury, no matter how slightly, he 
would be completely barred from recovering any damages from a 
negligent defendant.32  Parts II.A.1–2 discuss how courts have attempted 
to ameliorate the stringent rule of contributory negligence and replace it 
with a more equitable rule of comparative negligence that is more 
favorable to plaintiffs’ recovery.33  Part II.A.3 describes how some states 
have expanded their comparative negligence schemes to include types of 
fault other than negligence.34 
                                                 
28 See infra Part II.B (listing and discussing the different approaches to comparative fault 
by the states). 
29 See infra Part II.C (discussing the Restatement and the Uniform Comparative Fault 
Act). 
30 See infra Part II.D (detailing Johnson and Gunn’s list of important policy goals for tort 
law that will be used as a framework for analysis). 
31 See Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809) (establishing the common law 
doctrine of contributory negligence).  See also DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION:  
PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 233 (West 1985).  
Discussing this decision, Dobbs wrote: 
[f]rom Butterfield v. Forrester the courts developed the rule of 
contributory negligence as a complete defense.  Even relatively minor 
failure of the plaintiff to exercise ordinary care for his own safety 
would be a bar to any recovery.  This picture did not change even if 
the defendant’s negligence was extreme, so long as it fell short of a 
reckless or wanton act.   
Id. 
32 SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 5 (stating that under contributory negligence, if a 
plaintiff’s negligence contributed to the happening of an accident, he could not recover any 
damages from a negligent defendant who injured him). 
33 See infra Parts II.A.1–2 (detailing the creation of contributory negligence and its 
development into comparative negligence). 
34 See infra Part II.A.3 (describing how some states have expanded their allocation 
systems to include types of fault other than negligence, such as strict liability and 
intentional acts). 
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1. Common Law Contributory Negligence 
The doctrine of contributory negligence has its roots in the early 
nineteenth-century English case of Butterfield v. Forrester.35  In that case, 
the plaintiff was speeding on his horse when he hit an obstruction in the 
road that had been left by the defendant.36  The plaintiff fell off his horse 
and suffered injuries.37  When the plaintiff brought an action for 
damages against the defendant, the court held that he could not recover 
due to his own negligence in riding too fast.38  The decision in Butterfield 
established a precedent for the doctrine of contributory negligence that 
denied plaintiffs any compensation if they were at fault for any portion 
of their own injuries.39  Shortly thereafter, United States jurisdictions 
began to adopt and apply this doctrine.40 
                                                 
35 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).  Although many commentators claim that this case 
established the doctrine of contributory negligence that later gave rise to comparative 
negligence, Victor E. Schwartz suggests that comparative negligence may actually have 
been developed earlier than contributory negligence.  See SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 4–5.  
He suggested that, “[t]he Butterfield court was not bound to select this rule.  There was 
precedent in the law of admiralty for comparative negligence as a method of handling the 
case in which a plaintiff was at fault.”  Id. at 5. 
36 Butterfield, 103 Eng. Rep. at 927. 
37 Id. 
38 Id.  In the court’s reasoning, Lord Ellenborough stated that, “[a] party is not to cast 
himself upon an obstruction which has been made by the fault of another, and avail himself 
of it, if he do [sic] not himself use common and ordinary caution to be in the right.”  Id.  He 
continued by explaining that if a person rode on the wrong side of the road, that would not 
authorize someone else to intentionally ride up against that person.  Id.  In other words, 
“[o]ne person being in fault will not dispense with another’s using ordinary care for 
himself.”  Id.  Consequently, in order for the plaintiff to be able to recover damages, Lord 
Ellenborough concludes that there must be both an obstruction in the road by the fault of 
the defendant, and there must be “no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the 
plaintiff.”  Id. 
39 Id.  Describing how this doctrine functioned as a defense to a defendant’s negligence, 
Prosser and Keeton explained that contributory negligence occurs when the plaintiff 
contributes to the harm that he has suffered, which conduct “falls below the standard to 
which he is required to conform for his own protection.”  KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 
451.  However, unlike assumption of risk, contributory negligence is not based upon the 
idea that the defendant is relieved of his duties toward the plaintiff.  Id.  Rather, even 
though the defendant has breached his duty, the plaintiff is denied recovery because his 
own fault precludes him from maintaining the lawsuit.  Id. at 452.  Consequently, the law 
views both parties at fault and allows the defense to be “one of the plaintiff’s disability, 
rather than the defendant’s innocence.”  Id. at 452. 
40 See Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (Mass. 1824) (holding that a negligent 
plaintiff who overloaded his horse’s carriage and drove recklessly could not recover 
damages for injuries caused to his horse by the defendant’s woodpile).  See also W. Union 
Tel. Co. v. Hoffman, 15 S.W. 1048 (Tex. 1891).  In Hoffman, the plaintiff brought a negligence 
claim against Western Union for failure to deliver a telegram to a family doctor.  Id.  The 
plaintiff alleged that such failure caused his minor son to lose his arm after it had been 
broken, the treatment of which had been the reason the plaintiff sent the telegram.  Id.  The 
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2. The Emergence of Comparative Negligence 
Although contributory negligence was the rule in the United States 
for some time, courts began to determine that its results were too harsh 
on plaintiffs.41  Under contributory negligence, a plaintiff who was one 
percent at fault for causing his injuries recovered absolutely nothing.42  
Describing how this stringent rule may have come about, Lou Dobbs 
wrote, “[s]ometimes a seemingly incomplete or irrational rule is simply 
the result of conceptual failure—an inability to put together a coherent 
idea of what the rule ought to be.”43  As states began to recognize the 
inherent unfairness of contributory negligence, notions of comparative 
negligence developed and were adopted.44 
Comparative negligence differs from contributory negligence in that 
it permits a culpable plaintiff to recover damages from a defendant for a 
portion that does not include the plaintiff’s own percentage of fault.45  In 
                                                                                                             
Supreme Court of Texas held that because the plaintiff could have sent another message or 
procured other medical assistance, he could not recover against Western Union.  Id. 
41 See, e.g., Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 226 (N.J. 1991) (stating that the legislative 
decision to adopt comparative negligence was to ameliorate the harsh results of 
contributory negligence). 
42 Id. (stating that under contributory negligence, a negligent plaintiff was precluded 
from recovering damages “even when . . . [his] negligence was substantially less than the 
defendant’s.”). 
43 See DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 234 (1985).  Although Dobbs offers one explanation of 
the creation of contributory negligence, Prosser and Keeton described other theories that 
have been proffered for this doctrine.  KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 452.   One theory is 
that contributory negligence has a “penal basis” and exists to deny a plaintiff recovery to 
punish him for his misconduct.  Id.  Another theory is that the law requires a plaintiff to 
come into court with “clean hands.”  Id.  Some have also said that contributory negligence 
is founded upon voluntary assumption of the risk.  Id.  However, Prosser and Keeton 
suggest that this theory is unsound because negligence can exist without knowing the risk 
of the behavior.  Id.  Last, contributory negligence has also been explained in terms of 
proximate causation because “the plaintiff’s negligence is an intervening, or insulating, 
cause between the defendant’s negligence and the result.”  Id. 
44 See infra notes 45–58 and accompanying text (discussing the move in this country from 
contributory negligence to comparative negligence). 
45 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81(1) (stating that the effect of contributory fault is that 
“any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount 
awarded as economic and noneconomic damages for an injury attributable to the 
claimant’s contributory fault, but does not bar recovery.”).  Furthermore, the Iowa 
comparative fault statute states the following: 
Contributory fault shall not bar recovery in an action by a claimant to 
recover damages for fault resulting in death or in injury to person or 
property unless the claimant bears a greater percentage of fault than 
the combined percentage of fault attributed to the defendants, third-
party defendants and persons who have been released pursuant to 
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the United States, at least three basic systems have developed.46  First, a 
number of jurisdictions have adopted what is called the “pure” form of 
contributory negligence.47  This system of contributory negligence 
permits a plaintiff to recover against a defendant even if his negligence 
rises to a greater proportion than that of the defendant’s; however, the 
plaintiff’s damage award is reduced by his percentage of fault.48 
Second, some states use a modified system of comparative 
negligence that can take one of two forms.49  There is the “forty-nine 
percent” system that allows a plaintiff to recover only if his fault is less 
than that of the defendant’s, i.e., less than fifty percent.50  If his fault is 
                                                                                                             
section 668.7, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in 
proportion to the amount of fault attributable to the claimant. 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3(1)(a). 
46 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 32–33; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 471–74.  
The three forms of comparative fault are the pure form, the modified form, and the slight-
gross system. 
47 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.17.060, 09.17.900; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81; LA. CIV. CODE 
ANN. art. 2323; Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975); Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 
886 (Ill. 1981); Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1983); Hilen v. Hays, 673 
S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984). 
48 Lee A. Wright, Comment, Utah’s Comparative Fault Apportionment:  What Happened to 
the Comparison?, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 543, 552 (1998).  Wright explains how this system 
functions by stating, “[u]nder this approach, a plaintiff’s recovery is diminished by the 
plaintiff’s percentage of negligence, regardless of which party bears the greater portion of 
fault.”  Id.  Describing this system further, Prosser and Keeton stated that “a plaintiff’s 
contributory negligence does not operate to bar his recovery altogether, but does serve to 
reduce his damages in proportion to his fault.”  KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 472.  This 
aim of the system is to compensate injured plaintiffs for all of the harm attributable to the 
defendant’s wrongdoing.  Id. In the case of multiple defendants, “all are liable to the 
plaintiff for their respective shares of the loss, even though some may have been less 
negligent than he.”  Id. 
49 KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 473–74 (explaining the modified forms of comparative 
negligence). 
50 SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 33.  Wisconsin instituted this system when it adopted 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045(1) which states: 
Contributory negligence does not bar recovery in an action by any 
person or the person’s legal representative to recover damages for 
negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if that 
negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against 
whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be 
diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to 
the person recovering.  The negligence of the plaintiff shall be 
measured separately against the negligence of each person found to be 
causally negligent.  The liability of each person found to be causally 
negligent whose percentage of causal negligence is less than 51% is 
limited to the percentage of the total causal negligence attributed to 
that person.  A person found to be causally negligent whose 
percentage of causal negligence is 51% or more shall be jointly and 
severally liable for the damages allowed. 
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equal to or greater than that of the defendant’s, common law 
contributory negligence is triggered, and the plaintiff recovers nothing.51  
The other form of modified comparative negligence, i.e., the fifty-percent 
system, varies only slightly from the former in that it precludes a 
plaintiff’s recovery if his fault is equal to or greater than fifty-one 
percent.52 
Third, some states use a slight-gross system when applying 
comparative negligence.53  In order for the plaintiff to recover under this 
approach, his negligence must be only slight or minimal, whereas the 
defendant’s negligence must be gross by comparison.54  The plaintiff’s 
damage award is diminished by his percentage of negligent fault.55 
                                                                                                             
Id.  This statute appears to be the first of its kind; as a result, the 50% system is sometimes 
referred to as the Wisconsin system of comparative negligence.  See SCHWARTZ, supra note 
21, at 33. 
51 KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 474 (describing this system as the “equal fault bar” 
that precludes plaintiff recovery if his fault is equal to or greater than the defendant’s 
fault). 
52 SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 34.  As a result, this system allows a plaintiff to recover if 
his fault is equal to or less than that of the defendants’ fault.  Id. 
53 Two states that have adopted this approach are Nebraska and South Dakota.  See NEB. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21, 185 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-1 et. seq. (2007); see also 
Brandon v. County of Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2001); Frey v. Kouf, 484 N.W.2d 
864 (S.D. 1992).  The Nebraska Statute states in part that, “the fact that the plaintiff may 
have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery when the contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence or act or omission giving rise to 
strict liability in tort of the defendant was gross in comparison[] . . . .”  NEB. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 25-21, 185. 
54 SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 33. 
55 Id.  Along with understanding the three types of comparative negligence systems in 
the United States, it is also important to note the effects of joint and several liability on 
these systems.  For instance, under any comparative negligence system, is the plaintiff’s 
negligence compared with each individual defendant, or against the aggregate of all of the 
defendants’ fault combined?  See SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 317.  A number of states 
mandate that the plaintiff’s negligence be compared against the combined negligence of the 
joint defendants.  See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132; 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31; IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-4(b); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3; NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 141.1(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 31-610; OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13; OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470.  However, states such as Idaho compare the 
plaintiff’s negligence to that of each individual defendant.  See Odenwalt v. Zaring, 624 
P.2d 383, 387 (Idaho 1981); see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-801 (2007).  In Odenwalt, the 
plaintiff’s truck collided with one of the defendant’s cows that was allowed to wander onto 
an interstate highway at night, causing injury to the plaintiff.  624 P.2d at 384.  The plaintiff 
sued the defendant and his association in charge of the cattle for negligence for allowing 
the cow to roam.  Id.  The trial court found the two defendants to be ten percent and sixty-
five percent at fault, respectively, and the plaintiff to be twenty-five percent at fault.  Id.  
The issue on appeal was whether the plaintiff could recover when he was more at fault 
than one defendant, but was less at fault than the aggregate of both the defendants’ 
negligence combined.  Id. at 386.  The court looked to the State of Wisconsin that had 
construed its similar statute to require “individual or one-on-one comparison.” Id. at 387 
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The foregoing innovations for allocating fault have been successful 
in reducing the harsh impact that contributory negligence has had on 
plaintiffs.56  However, comparative negligence is not without its own 
shortcomings, and courts continue to grapple with ever-evolving fact 
scenarios.57  It follows, then, that courts are beginning to move beyond 
the more progressive forms of contributory negligence founded by 
comparative negligence.58 
3. The Rise of Fault Beyond Negligence in Apportioning Liability 
Common law contributory negligence was a defense only to acts that 
were negligent.59  As states transitioned from contributory to 
                                                                                                             
(applying the holding in Reiter v. Dyken, 290 N.W.2d 510 (Wis. 1980)).  The Idaho court 
adopted this approach and held that the plaintiff could not recover against the defendant 
who was 10% at fault.  Odenwalt, 624 P.2d at 387–88. 
 Moreover, how joint and several liability is construed will affect the amount of 
damages a plaintiff may recover.  SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 317.  For instance, if a 
plaintiff’s negligence is compared against each defendant individually, under a fifty-
percent system, a thirty-percent-at-fault plaintiff could not recover against three defendants 
who were each twenty to twenty-five percent at fault.  Id. Conversely, if the plaintiff’s 
negligence is compared to the aggregate fault of all of the defendants, the plaintiff may 
recover seventy percent of the loss.  Id. 
56 See, e.g., Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).  In Hilen, the plaintiff was severely 
injured when the driver of the car in which the plaintiff was a passenger crashed and 
overturned the vehicle.  Id. at 714.  The issue at trial was whether the plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent by riding in a car with a driver that she knew was intoxicated.  Id.  
The trial court instructed the jury on the defense of contributory negligence, and the jury 
awarded the plaintiff no damages as a result.  Id.  The plaintiff appealed, arguing that 
comparative fault should be adopted by Kentucky.  Id.  The Kentucky Supreme Court 
determined that the issue before them was “whether there are principles of fundamental 
fairness, underlying the application of contributory negligence as a defense, so compelling 
that contributory negligence as a complete defense should be discarded as part of the 
common law of this state in favor of comparative negligence.”  Id. at 717.  After reviewing 
many arguments for and against comparative negligence, the court held that 
where contributory negligence has previously been a complete 
defense, it is supplanted by the doctrine of comparative negligence.  In 
such cases contributory negligence will not bar recovery but shall 
reduce the total amount of the award in the proportion that the 
claimant's contributory negligence bears to the total negligence that 
caused the damages. 
Id. at 720.  As a result, the plaintiff could recover for at least the driver’s percentage of the 
fault, rather than receiving no compensation at all.  Id. 
57 See also infra Part II.B (discussing how courts struggle with the inclusion of intentional 
torts in comparative fault systems). 
58 See infra Part II.A.3 (chronicling the expansion of comparative negligence to include 
other forms of fault). 
59 KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 462.  On this, Prosser and Keeton stated as follows:   
The ordinary contributory negligence of the plaintiff is to be set over 
against the ordinary negligence of the defendant, to bar the action.  But 
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comparative negligence, many states maintained that contributory 
negligence should be applied exclusively to negligence claims.60  But 
some states now expand their comparative schemes by substituting the 
word “fault” for “negligence” in their statutes, or by broadly construing 
key terms within their laws to allow for other forms of fault outside of 
negligence.61 
In Bohan v. Ritzo, for example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
enlarged the reach of its comparative negligence system by adopting a 
“comparative causation” approach when evaluating damages under 
claims of strict liability.62  The court held that the state’s comparative 
fault statute applied to “all tort actions, not merely actions founded in 
negligence[]” and, accordingly, that a dog-bite cause of action could be 
analyzed under it.63  Even though the court noted that by definition strict 
                                                                                                             
where the defendant’s conduct is actually intended to inflict harm 
upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the 
kind of fault; and the defense never has been extended to such 
intentional torts. 
Id.  The authors also state that contributory negligence was also not available to cases 
involving strict liability.  Id.  As a result, the two areas of tort law other than negligence—
intentional acts and strict liability—were excluded from the defense of contributory fault.   
See supra note 21 and accompanying text (stating that the three bases of tort law are 
intentional acts, negligence, and strict liability). 
60 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (2007) (stating that, “[i]n determining by what 
amount of the plaintiff’s damages shall be diminished in such a case, the negligence of each 
plaintiff shall be compared to the total negligence of all persons against whom recovery is 
sought”).  Moreover, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine described Maine’s exclusive 
application of comparative fault to negligent conduct by stating that “[c]ontributory 
negligence never has been considered a good defense to an intentional tort such as a 
battery, and it would likewise appear contrary to sound policy to reduce a plaintiff’s 
damages under comparative fault for his ‘negligence’ in encountering the defendant’s 
deliberately inflicted harm.” McLain v. Training and Development Corp., 572 A.2d 494, 497 
(Me. 1990).  The court went on to declare, “[w]e have never recognized contributory or 
comparative negligence as a defense to the intentional tort of assault and battery and we 
decline to do so now.”  Id. 
61 For example, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(2) includes in the meaning of fault 
“negligence in all its degrees, comparative negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, 
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, 
modification, or abuse of product.”  See also Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1086 (Utah 
1998) (Stewart, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  In this case, Justice Stewart stated 
that the term, “fault,” was broadened “to apply to comparative principles in products 
liability and breach of warranty cases so that defenses such as misuse, abuse of product 
modification, etc., were no longer absolute bars to recovery[.]”  Id. 
62 679 A.2d 597, 601 (N.H. 1996).  In this case, as the plaintiff rode his bicycle past the 
defendant’s house, the defendant’s dog chased after the plaintiff.  Id. at 599.  Fearing that 
the dog might bite him, the plaintiff stuck out his leg, looked down at the dog, and then 
lost control of his bicycle and fell down.  Id.  The dog never bit the plaintiff.  Id. 
63 Id. at 601.  The text of New Hampshire’s comparative fault statute reads as follows: 
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liability and comparative negligence were not compatible because the 
former requires no showing of fault, the court decided that the disparity 
could be reconciled by looking at the “comparative causation” of the 
parties rather than their actual fault.64 
In the same vein, New York created its own unique brand of 
comparative fault by incorporating language such as “culpable conduct” 
into its apportionment scheme.65  The lower appellate court in New York 
applied this language in the case of Comeau v. Lucas.66  In Comeau, the 
plaintiff sustained a head injury when an intoxicated member of a rock 
band, who had been entertaining at a party, intentionally assaulted 
him.67  The plaintiff brought a battery claim against the rocker, along 
                                                                                                             
Contributory fault shall not bar recovery in an action by any plaintiff 
or plaintiff’s legal representative, to recover damages in tort for death, 
personal injury or property damage, if such fault was not greater than 
the fault of the defendant, or the defendants in the aggregate if 
recovery is allowed against more than one defendant, but the damages 
awarded shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of fault 
attributed to the plaintiff by general verdict.  The burden of proof as to 
the existence or amount of fault attributable to a party shall rest upon 
the party making such allegation. 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-d. 
64 Bohan, 679 A.2d at 601.  Interestingly, other states also allow negligence and strict 
liability to be compared in their comparative fault schemes, even though strict liability 
requires no showing of fault.  See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(2).  Defining the 
common understanding of strict liability, Prosser and Keeton state that 
‘[s]trict liability,’. . . as that term is commonly used by modern courts, 
means liability that is imposed on an actor apart from either (1) an 
intent to interfere with a legally protected interest without a legal 
justification for doing so, or (2) a breach of a duty to exercise 
reasonable care, i.e., actionable negligence.  This is often referred to as 
liability without fault.   
KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 534. 
65 See N.Y.C.P.L.R. 1411 (McKinney 2007).  The statute states: 
In any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to 
property, or wrongful death, the culpable conduct attributable to the 
claimant or to the decedent, including contributory negligence, or 
assumption of risk, shall not bar recovery, but the amount of damages 
otherwise recoverable shall be diminished in the proportion which the 
culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or decedent bears to the 
culpable conduct which caused the damages. 
Id. 
66 455 N.Y.S.2d 871 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). 
67 Id.  In Comeau, a teenage girl hosted a party, where she provided alcohol beverages.  
Id.  She did this, with her parents’ consent, while her parents were out of the country.  Id.   
During the party, the plaintiff’s head was seriously injured after a member of the rock band 
hired to play at the party intentionally assaulted him.  Id.  Prior to that event, the plaintiff 
had also engaged in disruptive and drunken behavior.  Id.  Most of the guests at the party 
were minors under the age of eighteen.  Id. 
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with negligence actions against the hostess of the party and her parents, 
for failure to properly supervise the event.68 
On appeal, the court affirmed the lower court’s jury award for the 
battery claim and awarded $250,000 in compensatory damages and 
$30,000 in punitive damages to the plaintiff.69  However, the court 
reduced the amount by ten percent due to the plaintiff’s own “culpable 
conduct” by drinking and engaging in disruptive behavior.70  The 
appellate court then reinstated the negligence claims against the hostess 
and her parents that had been dismissed by the trial court, and 
remanded those issues for determination.71  In the end, the court applied 
New York’s “culpable conduct” statute to compare every party’s fault, 
regardless of the type of tort committed.72 
States like New Hampshire and New York set the stage for others to 
rethink their own approaches to comparative fault.73  Some states began 
to apply comparative principles to actions formerly excluded from fault 
                                                 
68 Id.  Specifically, the plaintiff’s allegations were that because the hostess’s parents gave 
their consent to the event and knew that minors would be present and drinking alcohol 
and that a rock band had been hired, they failed to properly supervise the party given by 
their 16 year-old daughter, even though they were out of the country at the time of the 
party.  Id.  Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed the hostess was individually liable as the 
agent of her parents for failing to properly supervise the party in the absence of her 
parents.  Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id.  The court reasoned that the plaintiff had made a prima facie case against the 
parents of the hostess for failure to supervise because of their consent to the party.  Id. at 
675.  Furthermore, the court said that the hostess was the agent of the parents because the 
parents expressly placed their daughter in control of the premises, authorized the party, 
and gave their daughter instructions to be followed.  Id. 
72 Id.  But see New York v. Corwen, 565 N.Y.S.2d 457 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding that 
intentional torts could not be included in a civil action to recover bribes paid to city officials 
who had been convicted of racketeering).  In Corwen, the city of New York brought an 
action to recover bribes paid to city officials.  Id.  Discussing the issue of allocating fault and 
including intentional torts, the court reasoned: 
The defendants-appellants also contend that the IAS Court erroneously 
barred the city's claimed negligence as a defense to the intentional tort 
causes of action.  While the Corwen defendants did not explicitly 
assert comparative negligence as a defense, they did assert negligence 
as a recoupment and setoff and the IAS court correctly regarded that as 
identical to asserting a comparative negligence defense.  In the past, 
contributory negligence clearly has not been regarded as a defense to 
intentional torts and that appears to remain the rule with respect to 
comparative negligence. 
Id. at 459-60 (citations omitted).  As a result, in this opinion, the court did not allow 
comparisons between intentional and negligent fault.  Id. 
73 See infra Part II.B (discussing the approaches of different states regarding the inclusion 
of intentional torts). 
Fox: Can Apples Be Compared to Oranges? A Policy-Based Approach for De
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
274 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
allocation, such as breach of warranty or products liability.74  But the 
most controversial expansion of comparative fault has been when it is 
applied to torts that are intentional in nature.75 
B. The Fifty States and the Inclusion of Intentional Torts into Comparative 
Fault 
In the wake of many states broadening the reach of comparative 
fault, some states now struggle with the question of whether to allow 
comparisons between negligent acts and intentional acts.76  Presently, the 
majority of states does not permit such comparisons.77  But an emerging 
                                                 
74 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(2) (stating that “fault” includes negligence, 
assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express or implied warranty, products liability, 
and misuse, modification, and abuse of a product).  Discussing this statute, Justice Stewart 
of the Utah Supreme Court determined that the Utah legislature “broadened the statute to 
apply comparative principles in products liability and breach of warranty cases so that 
defenses such as misuse, abuse of product modification, etc., were no longer absolute bars 
to recovery but operated only to reduce a plaintiff’s recovery, as in negligence cases.”  Field 
v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1086 (Utah 1998) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part).    
75 See infra Part II.B.2 (describing the states that include intentional torts when 
comparing fault). 
76 See, e.g., Field v. Boyer, 952 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1998); see also Jedrziewski v. Smith, 128 
P.3d 1146 (Utah 2005).  Also, the term “comparison” in this context refers to the concept of 
a court grouping the fault of all contributors to an injury together, then comparing each to 
decide what percentage was caused by whom, and then dividing up the damages between 
the culpable parties according to those percentages.  And, as this Note will discuss, issues 
arise when the acts of defendants who committed intentional torts are allowed to be 
compared to the acts of negligent defendants under traditional comparative fault allocation 
systems.  See infra Part III (analyzing the issue as it now stands before the states). 
77 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (2007); see also Kellerman v. Zeno, 983 S.W.2d 136 
(Ark. 1998).  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West 2007); see also Heiner v. Kmart Corp., 84 
Cal.App. 4th 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).  See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West 2007); 
see also Bhinder v. Sun Co., 819 A.2d 822 (Conn. 2003).  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 8132 
(2007); see also Rochester v. Katalan, 320 A.2d 704 (Del. 1974).  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 
(West 2007); see also Vantran Indus., Inc., 890 So. 2d 421 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).  See Gates 
v. Navy, 617 S.E.2d 163 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).  See Poole v. Rolling Meadows, 656 N.E.2d 768 
(Ill. 1995).  See IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.1 et seq. (West 2007); see also Hansen v. Anderson, 
Wilmarth & Van Der Maaten, 630 N.W.2d 818 (Iowa 2001).  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a 
(2007); see also Sieben v. Sieben, 646 P.2d 1036 (Kan. 1982).  See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, 
§ 156 (2007); see also McLain v. Training and Dev. Corp., 572 A.2d 494 (Me. 1990).  See MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West 2007); see also Flood v. Southland Corp., 616 N.E.2d 
1068 (Mass. 1993).  See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01(West 2007); see also Florenzano v. Olson, 
387 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 1986).  See MISS. CODE. ANN. § 85-5-7 (2007); Dawson v. Townsend 
& Sons, Inc., 735 So. 2d 1131 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).  See MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.765 (West 
2007); see also Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983).  See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-
702 (2007); see also Martel v. Power Co., 752 P.2d 140, 143 (Mont. 1988) (holding that all 
forms of conduct can be compared that fall short of intentional acts to cause injury or 
damage).  See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21, 185 (West 2007); see also Brandon v. County of 
Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2001).  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141; see also Davies v. 
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minority of states includes intentional torts either by statute,78 judicial 
interpretation, or decree.79  Still, other states have yet to resolve this issue 
within their jurisdictions.80  Part II.B discusses how each state 
approaches this issue.81 
                                                                                                             
Butler, 602 P.2d 605 (Nev. 1979).  See Coleman v. Hines, 515 S.E.2d 57 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999).  
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.33 (West 2007); see also Labadie v. Semler, 585 N.E.2d 862 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1990).  See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 6 (West 2007); see also Parret v. Unicco 
Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572 (Okla. 2005).  See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.600, et seq. (West 2007); 
see also Shin v. Sunriver Preparatory Sch., Inc., 111 P.3d 762 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).  See 
Johnson v. Phila., 808 A.2d 978 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (2007); 
see also Calise v. Hidden Valley Condo. Assoc., Inc., 773 A.2d 834 (2001).  See S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 20-9-1 et. seq. (2007); see also Frey v. Kouf, 484 N.W.2d 864 (S.D. 1992).  See TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (2007); see also Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 
S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1991), modified, Tony Gullo Motors I v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2006).  
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (2007).   See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.070 (West 2007); 
see also Tegman v. Accident & Med. Investigations, Inc., 75 P.3d 497 (Wash. 2003).  See 
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).  See WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 895.045 (West 2007); see also Crest Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc. v. Willemsen, 384 
N.W.2d 692 (Wis. 1986). 
78 See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.17.900 (2007) (including intentional torts in the definition 
of fault); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-803 (2007) (allowing negligence and comparative 
responsibility to be compared); IND. CODE. ANN. § 34-6-2-45 (West 2007) (including willful, 
wanton, reckless, and intentional acts under the definition of fault); MICH. COMP. LAWS. 
ANN. § 600.6304 (West 2007) (including intentional misconduct within the definition of 
fault); N.Y.C.P.L.R. 1411 (designating comparisons between “culpable conduct”); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 32-03. 2-02 (2007) (including in the definition of fault, “willful conduct”); see 
also Hansen v. Scott, 645 N.W.2d 223, 229 (N.D. 2002) (interpreting the language of the 
statute to include intentional acts). 
79 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (2007); see also Hutcherson v. Phoenix, 961 P.2d 
449 (Ariz. 1998).  See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.5 (West 2007); see also Toothman v. 
Freeborn & Peters, 80 P.3d 804, 815-16 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) (allowing intentional and 
negligent torts to be compared between joint defendants, but not between the plaintiff and 
defendants).  See HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (2007); see also Ozaki v. Assoc. of Apartment 
Owners of Discovery Bay, 954 P.2d 652 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998), rev’d in part on other grounds, 
954 P.2d 644 (Haw. 1998).  See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182 (West 2007); see also Roman 
Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).  See LA. CIV. 
CODE ANN. art. 2323 (2007); see also Landry v. Bellanger, 851 So. 2d 943, 954 (La. 2003) 
(holding that intentional and negligent torts will be compared between the plaintiff and 
defendants only when the plaintiff is negligent, but not when the plaintiff’s conduct was 
intentional).  See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-d (2007); see also Bohan, 679 A.2d at 601 
(stating that courts should look to “comparative causation” when allocating damages).  See 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1-5.2 (West 2007); see also Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 231-
32 (N.J. 1991) (stating that the fault of a negligent plaintiff and an intentional tortfeasing 
defendant can be compared).  See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1 (West 2007); see also Garcia v. 
Gordon, 98 P.3d 1044 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004).  See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-102 (2007); see 
also Limbaugh, 59 S.W.2d at 87.  See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (2007); see also Bd. Of County 
Comm’rs v. Bassett, 8 P.3d 1079 (Wyo. 2000). 
80 See Jedrziewski v. Smith, 128 P.3d 1146, 1151 (Utah 2005) (concluding that Utah has 
not resolved this issue, and the legislature may do so if it chooses).  Alabama, Maryland, 
South Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia continue to employ common law 
contributory negligence.  See Golden v. McCurry, 392 So. 2d 815, 817 (Ala. 1980); Harrison 
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1. States That Do Not Include Intentional Torts in Their Comparative 
Fault Systems 
The primary reason that a majority of states does not allow 
intentional torts within the reach of their comparative fault systems is 
that common law contributory negligence did not bar a plaintiff’s 
recovery if the harm caused was the result of intentional misconduct.82  
Other states are less concerned about the common law heritage of the 
principle than they are about the literal definitional differences between 
intentional acts and torts more akin to negligence.83  The Oregon Court 
of Appeals has gone so far as to characterize intentional-negligent 
evaluations as “conceptually incoherent[.]”84  Many courts insist that 
                                                                                                             
v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 456 A.2d 894, 905 (Md. 1983); Langley v. Boyter, 332 
S.E.2d 100, 101 (S.C. 1985); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Winesett, 303 S.E.2d 868, 872 (Va. 
1983); Sanai v. Polinger Co., 498 A.2d 520, 524 (D.C. 1985). 
81 See infra Parts II.B.1–4 (discussing the different approaches throughout United States 
jurisdictions). 
82 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 462; see also McLain v. Training and Dev. Corp., 
572 A.2d 494, 497 (Me. 1990) (stating that, in Maine “[c]ontributory negligence never has 
been considered a good defense to an intentional tort such as a battery, and it would 
likewise appear contrary to sound policy to reduce a plaintiff’s damages under 
comparative fault for his ‘negligence’ in encountering the defendant’s deliberately inflicted 
harm.”).  Also, the Court of Appeals of Oregon stated, “[b]efore the adoption of 
comparative fault, contributory negligence was not a defense to willful or intentional 
misconduct.”  Shin v. Sunriver Preparatory Sch., Inc., 111 P.3d 762, 776 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). 
83 See Labadie v. Semler, 585 N.E.2d 862, 864 (Ohio 1990) (stating that, “[n]egligence is 
synonymous with heedlessness, carelessness, thoughtlessness, disregard, inattention, 
inadvertence, remissness, and oversight.  Willfulness implies design, set purpose, intention, 
[and] deliberation[]”).  The court concluded that a willful actor is “conscious of his conduct, 
and conscious, from his knowledge of existing conditions, that injury would likely or 
probably result from his conduct, and that with reckless indifference to consequences[,] he 
consciously and intentionally did some wrongful act or omitted some known duty which 
produced the injurious result.”  Id.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated 
that, “[i]ntent. . .is broader than a desire to bring about physical results.  It must extend not 
only to those consequences which are desired, but also to those which the actor believes are 
substantially certain to follow from what he does.”  Parret v. Unicco Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 
577 (Okla. 2005).  Additionally, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island took the literal meaning 
of the statute and stated that, “[o]ur comparative negligence statute . . . is not a 
comparative fault statute.  It comes into play only after negligence is first established on the 
part of both the plaintiff and the defendant.”  Calise v. Hidden Valley Condo. Assoc., Inc., 
773 A.2d 834, 837 (2001). 
84 Shin, 111 P.3d at 776.  The Oregon court qualified this characterization by stating that 
negligence exists on a continuum of fault that begins with simple negligence and ends with 
gross negligence and recklessness.  Id.  Willful and intentional misconduct, however, is not 
on that continuum.  Id.  Describing the nature of intentional acts, the court determined, 
“[they do] not involve a mere neglect of responsibility, however serious; to the contrary, 
[they] involve[] a conscious decision to act in a way that risks harm to another.”  Id.  As a 
result, the court held that intentional misconduct and negligence were “qualitatively 
different” and are “not comparable.”  Id. 
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intentional acts and negligent conduct are not just different by degree, 
but they are absolutely different in the type of fault each embodies.85 
Some states choose to not include intentional torts when comparing 
fault because of public policy.86  For example, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court would not allow an insurance agent’s liability for intentional 
misrepresentations to be compared to any negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff because “where society wants certain conduct absolutely 
prohibited and discouraged, apportionment of fault is not 
appropriate.”87  The Nevada Supreme Court declared that intentional 
tortfeasors should not be able to reap the benefits of comparative fault by 
shifting any portion of their culpability to other parties.88  It has also been 
                                                 
85 See, e.g., Parret, 127 P.3d at 576.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that 
ordinary and gross negligence differ in degree, yet negligence and willful and wanton 
conduct differ in kind.  Id.  As a result, Oklahoma refused to expand its comparative fault 
to include willful and wanton or intentional misconduct.  Id.  See also KEETON ET AL, supra 
note 18, at 462 (stating that, “where the defendant’s conduct is actually intended to inflict 
harm upon the plaintiff, there is a difference, not merely in degree but in the kind of fault; 
and the defense [of contributory negligence] never has been extended to such intentional 
torts.”).  Interestingly, however, the Illinois Supreme Court differently characterized the 
disparity between intentional and negligent misconduct when it stated, “because of the 
‘qualitative difference’ between simple negligence and willful and wanton misconduct a 
plaintiff’s negligence . . . [can]not be compared with a defendant’s willful and wanton 
misconduct.”  Poole, 656 N.E.2d at 770 (emphasis added).   But see Gail D. Hollister, Using 
Comparative Fault to Replace the All-or-Nothing Lottery Imposed in Intentional Tort Suits in 
Which Both the Plaintiff and Defendant Are at Fault, 46 VAND. L. REV. 121, 138–41 (1993) 
(arguing that the distinction between intentional and negligent torts is often vague and 
varies only in degree, not in kind). 
86 See infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text (describing the holdings and reasoning of 
courts that adhere to this approach). 
87 Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168, 175–176 (Minn. 1986).  The court continued by 
stating that it is “bad [public] policy to permit an intentional tortfeasor the defense of 
comparative negligence merely because he or she chooses a gullible or foolish victim.”  Id. 
at 176.  See Hansen v. Anderson, Wilmarth & Van Der Maaten, 630 N.W.2d 818, 827 (Iowa 
2001).  In Hansen, the Supreme Court of Iowa stated that, “shifting the full responsibility for 
the loss to the intentional tortfeasor serves the policy of deterring conduct which society 
considers to be substantially more egregious than negligence.”  Id.  But see William 
Westerbeke, The Application of Comparative Responsibility to Intentional Tortfeasors and Immune 
Parties, 10-FALL KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 189, 190 (2000) (discussing how not all intentional 
torts rise to the “high culpability” level that society is so bent on prohibiting). 
88 Davies v. Butler, 602 P.2d 605, 611 (Nev. 1979).  In Davies, the parents of a young man 
brought a wrongful death action against a social drinking club when their son died of 
alcoholic poisoning during his initiation to the club.  Id. at 606–07.  The respondent 
drinking club on appeal argued that the decedent was contributorily negligent in that he 
consented to the initiation process.  Id. at 610.  However, the Nevada court disagreed and 
said that intentional wrongdoers “should not have the benefit of contributory 
negligence[.]”  Id. at 611.  See Lee A. Wright, Utah’s Comparative Apportionment:  What 
Happened to the Comparison?, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 543, 561 (1998) (describing how including 
intentional torts leads to under-accountability); see also Christopher M. Brown & Kirk A. 
Morgan, Consideration of Intentional Torts in Fault Allocation:  Disarming the Duty to Protect 
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argued that apportionment of fault between intentional and negligent 
actors diminishes the deterrent elements designed to prevent intentional 
misconduct.89  But whatever the rationale, the majority of states 
continues to keep intentional torts separate from negligence when 
allocating fault.90 
                                                                                                             
Against Intentional Misconduct, 2 WYO. L. REV. 483, 511–12 (2002) (discussing that the duty to 
prevent harm will be diminished by including intentional torts). 
89 See Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 231 (N.J. 1991) (rejecting this argument because 
a plaintiff’s comparative fault will reduce only the recovery of compensatory damages, not 
the recovery of punitive damages). 
90 See supra note 77 (listing the authority for states that do not include intentional torts 
when comparing fault).  The effect of not including intentional torts in comparative fault is 
illustrated in the decision of Brandon v. County of Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2001).  
In Brandon, the decedent had been sexually abused as a child and, as a result, developed a 
gender-identity disorder.  Id.  In 1993, she came to Richardson County and held herself out 
to the public as a man.  Id.  The decedent met a young woman, who believed the decedent 
was a man, and they dated for approximately one month.  Id.  However, the decedent’s 
true gender fell under suspicion when she went to jail on charges of forgery and the county 
placed her in the female area.  Id.  Subsequently, in an attempt to verify their suspicions, 
two male friends of the decedent and her girlfriend forcibly removed the decedent’s pants 
and then drove her to a remote location where they brutally beat and raped her.  Id.  After 
the decedent had been raped and beaten, she managed to escape through a bathroom 
window to report the event to the sheriff’s department.  Id. at 611.  However, the sheriff 
who took her interview demeaned and belittled the decedent, by referring to her as an “it” 
and crudely and insensitively questioning her about her gender-identity crisis and the rape.  
Id. at 611–13.  Furthermore, no arrests were made, even after questioning the two men and 
knowing that each had significant criminal records and had made threats on the decedent’s 
life if she revealed the incident.  Id. at 614.  Within the week, however, the two men 
murdered the decedent, along with two other people, in a rural farmhouse.  Id. at 610.  The 
trial court awarded the plaintiff, who was the mother of the decedent, $6,223.20 in 
economic damages and $80,000 in noneconomic damages.  Id. at 618.  However, because 
the court found the victim to be one percent at fault and the intentional tortfeasors to be 
eighty-five percent at fault, it reduced the plaintiff’s award against the county by those 
percentages.  Id.  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed the trial court’s 
decision and held that the allocation of damages under the state’s comparative negligence 
scheme applied only to negligent tortfeasors and not to those who acted intentionally.  Id. 
at 619.  The Nebraska Supreme Court invoked two common reasons for their holding.  Id. 
at 619–20.  First, the court determined that the state’s comparative negligence law only 
applied to civil actions in which contributory negligence was a defense, and because at 
common law contributory negligence was not a defense to intentional torts, the court 
would likewise not allow comparative negligence to be a defense to an intentional tort.  Id.  
Furthermore, the court reasoned that when a defendant intends to inflict harm, “there is a 
difference, not merely in degree, but in the kind of fault[.]”  Id. at 619.  Second, the court 
determined that the plain language of the statute specified the word “negligence” as the 
kind of tort that is appropriate for comparative fault; thus, intentional torts could not be 
included.  Id. at 620.  As a result, the court mandated that the plaintiff’s award not be 
reduced by the eighty-five percent of fault attributable to the two men who raped and 
murdered her daughter and that the county be liable for the entire amount.  Id. at 628. 
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2. States That Include Intentional Torts When Comparing Fault 
Despite the trend to not allow intentional torts into comparative fault 
analysis, an increasing minority of states is now expanding their fault-
allocating systems to include intentional wrongdoing.91  A few states 
have included intentional acts by statute and have applied the principles 
in varying situations.92  Other states have incorporated intentional 
misconduct by judicial interpretation or decree.93  For instance, the 
Arizona Supreme Court upheld a jury determination in a civil case that 
found the city of Phoenix to be seventy-five percent at fault for the 
murder of the plaintiffs’ children, whereas the murderer was held to be 
only twenty-five percent at fault.94  The court reasoned that it could find 
no compelling authority requiring that intentional acts be weighed more 
heavily than those that are negligent.95 
                                                 
91 See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (listing authority for states that have 
adopted comparative fault systems that include intentional torts). 
92 See supra notes 77–80 (listing all the statutes in the various states); see also Hansen v. 
Scott, 645 N.W.2d 223 (N.D. 2002) (allocating fault between the murderer of the plaintiffs’ 
mother and the Department of Criminal Justice for failing to fully disclose a parolee’s 
criminal background and for failing to adequately supervise the parolee); Joseph v. Alaska, 
26 P.3d 459 (Alaska 2001) (holding that in the case of an inmate committing suicide, 
because the jail was in a custodial relationship, the intentional act of suicide could not bar 
the plaintiff from recovering under negligence, even if such negligence was not 
foreseeable); Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., 14 P.3d 1074 (Idaho 2000) (allowing 
comparisons between the fault of a defendant who caused injury to the plaintiff when he 
intentionally and jokingly pulled a chair out from under the plaintiff); Coffman v. 
Rohrman, 811 N.E.2d 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (allowing comparisons, where a real estate 
agent intentionally did not disclose that the plaintiff would have to assume costs associated 
with access road construction); Lamp v. Reynolds, 645 N.W.2d 311 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) 
(allowing defendant’s intentional misconduct to be compared when a motor-cross racer hit 
a concealed tree stump on the perimeter of a racetrack and sustained injuries resulting from 
the accident); Comeau v. Lucas, 90 A.D.2d 674, 674–75 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). 
93 See supra note 79 (listing the jurisdictions that adopted this approach through judicial 
decree). 
94 Hutcherson v. Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449, 453 (Ariz. 1998).  In Hutcherson, the City of 
Phoenix received a telephone call from a young woman worried about being assaulted by 
her former boyfriend.  Id. at 450.  After hearing the woman explain that her ex-boyfriend 
had been pursuing her all night and threatened her, the 911 Operator twice said that she 
would send an officer as soon as she could.  Id.  Twenty-two minutes after the 911 phone 
call, the ex-boyfriend entered the house where the woman was hiding and fatally shot her 
and her current boyfriend before turning the gun on himself.  Id. at 450–51.  The mothers of 
the victims brought a wrongful death action against the city because the operator had 
categorized the emergency call as Priority 3, the average response time of which is 32.6 
minutes.  Id. at 451. 
95 Id. at 452–53.  The court also quoted the dissenting opinion from the lower appellate 
court on this same matter that stated: 
The murderer’s culpability is enormous, the operator’s is slight.  He 
committed deliberate homicide; she misjudged the severity of the call.  
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States that have adopted this approach have not done so uniformly.96  
Colorado permits the inclusion of intentional torts between joint 
defendants, but does not permit it when comparing the fault of a 
plaintiff to that of a defendant.97  Louisiana, on the other hand, allows a 
plaintiff’s fault to be compared to a defendant’s intentional act, but only 
when the plaintiff also acted intentionally.98  Furthermore, Tennessee has 
a limited approach of applying comparative fault to intentional torts that 
applies only between defendants and only when both are named parties 
to the lawsuit.99  Tennessee requires this to prevent what is known as the 
“empty chair” defense.100 
                                                                                                             
And when it comes to contribution to causation, at first blush, the 
imbalance again weighs heavily toward the murderer.  When you add 
relative timing into the picture, however, the balance starts to shift.  
The operator has notice of a potentially imminent harm and a chance 
to avoid it.  This is a proper factor for the fact finder to weigh.  It is also 
proper for the fact finder to weigh the operator’s responsibility for 
foresight and avoidance.  It enters into the weighing of relative degrees 
of fault. 
Id. at 453 (quoting Hutcherson v. Phoenix, 933 P.2d 1251, 1265–66 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1996) (Grant, J., dissenting)). 
96 See supra notes 78–79 (listing authority for states that have adopted comparative fault 
systems that include intentional torts). 
97 See Toothman v. Freeborn & Peters, 80 P.3d 804, 815–16 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).  In 
Toothman, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants intentionally defrauded investors by 
organizing, promoting, and selling interests in fifty-three limited liability partnerships.  Id. 
at 807.  In deciding that the fault of the intentionally tortfeasing defendants could not be 
reduced by the plaintiff’s negligence, the court determined that 
the [Colorado] supreme court has ruled that the pro rata statute 
requires apportionment of damages among the several defendants 
even when one of the tortfeasors commits an intentional tort that 
contributes to an indivisible injury.  However, we disagree . . . [that 
this] mandate[s] apportionment among plaintiffs when the underlying 
action alleges intentional . . . conduct by the defendants. 
Id. at 815–16 (citation omitted). 
98 Landry v. Bellanger, 851 So. 2d 943, 953–54 (La. 2003).  The Louisiana Supreme Court 
concluded that that a negligent plaintiff who is injured by the fault of an intentional 
tortfeasor will not have his damages reduced by his percentage of the fault.  Id. at 953.  
However, this “applies only when plaintiff’s contributory fault consists of negligence and 
does not apply where the plaintiff’s fault is intentional.”  Id. at 954. 
99 See Limbaugh v. Coffee Med. Ctr., 59 S.W.3d 73, 86–87 (Tenn. 2001).  But see Ozaki v. 
Assoc. of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay, 954 P.2d 652 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998), rev’d in 
part on other grounds, 954 P.2d 644, 662 (Haw. 1998) (using Hawaii’s pure form of 
comparative negligence broadly to apportion fault between a defendant’s intentional 
murder, the negligence of another defendant, and the victim of the murder).  In Ozaki, the 
jury found the murderer to be ninety-two percent at fault, the owner of the apartment 
complex where the murder took place to be three percent at fault, and the victim to be five 
percent at fault.  Id. at 657.  On appeal, the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed the allocation, 
reasoning that every person who had any contributory fault should be included because 
such would “accomplish a fairer and more equitable result” and “fairness and equity are 
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But the most groundbreaking expansion of comparative fault to 
include intentional torts comes from the Supreme Court of New Jersey.101  
In Blazovic v. Andrich, a group of men assaulted and injured the plaintiff 
outside of a bar after the plaintiff verbally tried to stop them from 
throwing rocks at a nearby sign.102  The jury at trial found that the owner 
of the bar where the assault took place, the intentional assaulters, and the 
plaintiff all contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries.103  The trial court 
nevertheless instructed the jury to compare only the relative fault of the 
plaintiff and the bar owner because it understood the comparative fault 
law to exclude intentional actors.104 
On appeal, the trial court’s decision was reversed, and the fault of 
the intentionally tortfeasing defendants was included in the allocation of 
liability.105  The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that it did not 
                                                                                                             
more important than conceptual and semantic consistency[.]” Id. at 660 (citing Kaneko v. 
Hilo Coast Processing, 654 P.2d 343, 352 (Haw. 1982)).  See also Garcia, 98 P.3d at 1047 
(explaining that, “[p]ure comparative negligence denies recovery for one’s own fault; it 
permits recovery to the extent of another’s fault; and it holds all parties fully responsible 
for their own respective acts to the degree that those acts have caused harm.”). 
100 Compare Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 86–87 with Hansen v. Scott, 645 N.W.2d 223, 229 (N.D. 
2002) (stating that the North Dakota’s comparative negligence statute “contemplates an 
‘empty chair’ defense, which specifically permits an allocation of fault to each person who 
contributed to an injury even though that person may not be a party to the action[]”).  Id.  
See E-mail from Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at the Law Offices of Phillip W. Dyer in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, to Senator Ross I. Romero, Utah Legislator (February 5, 2007, 5:58 p.m. MST) 
(on file with author) (commenting on this “empty chair” defense, and stating that this 
defense leads to the victim being victimized twice). 
101 See Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222 (N.J. 1991). 
102 Id. at 224.  The facts of the case are that while in the parking lot of a bar the plaintiff 
asked a group of men to stop throwing rocks at a nearby sign.  Id.  However, this fact was 
in dispute because the defendants claimed that the plaintiff repeatedly swore at them.  Id.  
Nevertheless, both sides agreed that a member of the group of men began a physical 
confrontation that resulted in the plaintiff being pushed to the ground and significantly 
beaten.  Id. 
103 Id.  Specifically, the fault attributed by the jury to each party was that the intentional 
tortfeasors assaulted the plaintiff, the bar failed to provide adequate lighting and security 
in the parking lot, and the plaintiff provoked the assault.  Id. at 233. 
104 Id. at 224. 
105 Id. at 225, 233.  The procedural posture in this case is that the lower appellate court 
reversed the trial court, and the State Supreme Court affirmed the lower appellate court on 
this specific issue.  Id.  Discussing the reasoning behind the holding in Blazovic and other 
cases that have relied on Blazovic, Theresa L. Fiset stated that the opinions were based on 
the premise that comparative fault was developed “to achieve a fairer distribution of loss in 
negligence actions by equating liability with fault.” Theresa L. Fiset, Comparative Fault As a 
Tool to Nullify the Duty to Protect:  Apportioning Liability to a Non-party Intentional Tortfeasor in 
Stellas v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 27 STETSON L. REV. 699, 713 (1997).  As a result, the courts 
in these decisions determined that the legislatures intended all tortious conduct to be 
included under comparative fault; therefore, “a jury must apportion liability for damages 
among intentional and negligent tortfeasors because they are all at ‘fault[.]’”  Id. at 713–14. 
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view intentional wrongdoing as different-in-kind from negligence, but 
merely different-in-degree.106  The court further reasoned that because 
the plaintiff’s comparative fault would reduce only his recovery of 
compensatory damages, the punitive damage award would remain 
intact to provide the necessary deterrent for intentional wrongdoing.107  
In short, the court expressed the view that fairness required a 
proportionate allocation of fault to all culpable parties.108 
Blazovic is significant because it illustrates the situation contemplated 
in the hypothetical above where a defendant commits an intentionally 
violent act and reduces his liability by the negligence of the plaintiff that 
he injured.109  Describing this issue further, Professor William 
Westerbeke stated, “Reduction of my obligation to pay damages in 
proportion to your contributory negligence may be appropriate if I am 
merely negligent in running my car into your car.  The reduction is far 
less appropriate if I intentionally crash into your car.”110  Therefore, the 
                                                 
106 Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 231 (N.J. 1991).  The court further explained that 
acting intentionally “involves knowingly or purposefully engaging in conduct 
‘substantially certain’ to result in injury to another.”  Id.  On the other hand, “wanton and 
willful conduct” differs in that it “poses a highly unreasonable risk of harm likely to result 
in injury.”  Id.  Nevertheless, the court decided that even those differences between 
intentional conduct and negligence did not preclude comparisons by a jury.  Id.  The court 
reasoned that the jury will reflect the different levels of culpability inherent in the different 
types of conduct.  Id.  The court also reasoned that by including intentional torts, “we 
adhere most closely to the guiding principle of comparative fault—to distribute the loss in 
proportion to the respective faults of the parties causing that loss.”  Id. 
107 Id. at 231–32.  The court explained that the design of punitive damages is “to punish 
the wrongdoer, and not to compensate the injured party[.]”  Id. at 232.  As a result, punitive 
damages are not subject to apportionment or contribution among joint tortfeasors.  Id. 
108 Id. at 233.  See also Ozaki v. Assoc. of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay, 954 P.2d 
652 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998), rev’d in part on other grounds, 954 P.2d 644, 662 (Haw. 1998) 
(stating that including intentional torts when comparing fault accomplishes fairer and 
more equitable results).  In Ozaki, the decedent was murdered by her boyfriend in her 
apartment.  Id. at 655.  Before the murder, the boyfriend came to the complex and asked the 
security guard to let him in to wait for the decedent.  Id.  The security guard allowed the 
boyfriend to enter, and the next day the decedent was found dead in her apartment due to 
either suffocation or strangulation.  Id.  The plaintiff, who was the decedent’s executor of 
the estate, and the decedent’s sister brought multiple claims including seeking damages for 
physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, future earnings, and loss of pleasure of 
being alive.  Id. at 655–56.  The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the fault of both the 
boyfriend and the apartment complex could be apportioned under comparative fault.  Id. at 
662.  The court reasoned that, “where a defendant’s intentional conduct, a co-defendant’s 
negligence, and the plaintiff’s negligence combine to cause the plaintiff’s damages, ‘pure 
comparative negligence principles’ should be applied and the plaintiff’s recovery should 
reflect the relative degrees of fault of all culpable parties as determined by the jury.”  Id. 
109 See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text (offering the hypothetical situation of a 
rapist reducing his civil liability by the negligence of the plaintiff). 
110 Westerbeke, supra note 87, at 190.  But Professor Westerbeke goes on to say that 
“[b]ecause contributory negligence rarely arises as a serious defense to an intentional tort, 
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decision in Blazovic may seem radical to those states that characterize the 
comparison of fault between a negligent plaintiff and a defendant acting 
intentionally as an absurdity.111 
3. States That Are Undecided as to Whether to Include Intentional 
Torts in Their Comparative Fault Systems 
Although few in number, there are a handful of states that have yet 
to clearly decide whether to include intentional torts in their comparative 
fault schemes.112  Utah, in particular, has unsuccessfully tried to resolve 
this issue in a recent series of state supreme court cases.113  First, in Field 
v. Boyer Co., the Utah Supreme Court discussed whether it should 
include the fault of an unknown sexual assailant who raped the plaintiff 
on the property of a store owned by the defendant.114  Upon reviewing 
the language of the statute that defines the word “fault,” the plurality of 
the court decided that “fault” included intentional conduct.115  The court 
                                                                                                             
comparative fault reductions would probably be infrequent and small[.]”  Id.  Westerbeke 
explains in his discourse that his view is that including intentional torts in comparative 
fault creates judicial economy and administrative efficiency.  Id.  He argues that most states 
extend comparative fault to reckless acts, and that such acts require some form of intent.  
Id.  Therefore, he states that, “Little if any public policy gains will result from burdening 
courts and attorneys with the need to try these tort actions under both ‘all or nothing’ and 
comparative responsibility principles until the trier of fact decides whether defendant’s 
conduct was intentional or merely reckless.”  Id. at 190–91. 
111 See Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1998) (Stewart, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part).  Furthermore, Ellen M. Bublick describes that some areas of the law 
could be dramatically impacted by allowing intentional tortfeasors to reduce their liability 
by the plaintiff’s negligence.  See Ellen M. Bublick, The End Game of Tort Reform:  Comparative 
Apportionment and Intentional Torts, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 355, 435 (2003).  In her article, 
Bublick stated that comparing a defendant’s intentional and negligent fault reduces the 
intentional tortfeasor’s liability to the plaintiff.  Id.  However, she suggests that allowing 
these comparisons may seem unimportant because many intentional tortfeasors will be 
absent or insolvent.  Id.  Nevertheless, Bublick states that there are large categories of cases 
in which comparing the fault of the defendant and plaintiff when intentional torts are 
involved will have a significant financial impact, such as intentional environmental harm.  
Id. 
112 See supra note 80 (listing states that are undecided on this issue). 
113 See Field, 952 P.2d at 1078–90; Jedrziewski v. Smith, 128 P.3d 1146, 1146–51 (Utah 
2005). 
114 Field, 952 P.2d at 1079.  In this case, the plaintiff was an employee of a department 
store located in the plaza owned by the defendants.  Id.  On a particular night, the plaintiff 
left work and walked to her car in the parking lot outside the store.  Id.  As she passed a set 
of stairs, someone assaulted her from behind by wrapping a rope around her neck, choking 
her to unconsciousness, and then physically and sexually assaulting her.  Id.  The plaintiff 
sued the store and the owners of the plaza for failing to provide adequate security for 
employees and customers.  Id.  The defendants moved to include the fault of the plaintiff’s 
unknown assailant into the jury’s apportionment of fault.  Id. 
115 Id. at 1080.  UTAH CODE § 78-27-37(2) states that “Fault” under the statute means: 
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reasoned that intentional acts could be compared because the statute 
contemplated any act proximately causing or contributing to the injury 
or damage.116 
After the Field decision, many believed that the court had decided 
the issue in favor of allowing intentional torts into Utah’s comparative 
fault scheme.117  However, in 2005 the Utah Supreme Court declared 
unequivocally that “the solution to the riddle of Field is that whether the 
. . .  [Utah comparative fault statute] applies to intentional torts remains 
an open question. . . .” and that “the legislature may, if it elects, answer 
                                                                                                             
any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission proximately 
causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person 
seeking recovery, including negligence in all [of] its degrees, 
comparative negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of 
express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and 
misuse, modification or abuse of a product. 
Id. 
116 Field, 952 P.2d at 1080.  The court continued, “[c]learly an intentional tort such as 
battery is an act that proximately causes or contributes to injury or damage.  Thus, we 
conclude that the legislature included intentional acts in its comparative fault scheme.”  Id.  
However, Justice Stewart wrote a scathing dissent discussing the injustice created by 
permitting an intentional actor to reduce his liability by a plaintiff’s negligence:  
The legal obligation not to assault or rape is absolute.  The law does 
not impose on a victim a duty to avoid a criminal act by another.  How 
can . . . [the] lead opinion countenance the proposition that a rapist’s 
liability can be reduced because the victim imprudently let the rapist 
into her home after a date?  How can the lead opinion countenance the 
proposition that a murderer’s liability in a wrongful death action can 
be reduced because a landlord failed to repair an apartment building’s 
locks?  If, as must surely be law, the rapist who assaulted [the plaintiff] 
should not be allowed to reduce his liability by the . . . defendants’ 
negligence, it is not logically possible to permit the…defendants to 
reduce their liability by offsetting the assailant’s criminal, intentional 
fault against their negligence[.]  
Id. at 1088.  Furthermore, Justice Stewart articulated the inherent unfairness to the plaintiff 
created by allowing a comparison of intentional fault in this case when he stated that 
[g]iven defendants’ duty to provide a safe workplace and their breach 
of that duty, it would be patently unfair to allow their liability to a 
faultless, injured plaintiff to be reduced or even eliminated by the 
culpability of an intentional wrongdoer, thereby depriving the faultless 
plaintiff of an adequate remedy or any remedy at all.  Such an 
application of comparative principles would eviscerate defendants’ 
duty to prevent such a wrong.  
Id. 
117 See Jedrziewski v. Smith, 128 P.3d 1149, 1148 (Utah 2005) (stating that many people, 
other than the members of the Utah Supreme Court, believed that the issue was resolved in 
the Field opinion). 
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it.”118  Despite a number of proposed bills, the state legislature has yet to 
resolve this issue for Utah.119 
C. Attempts at Uniformity:  the Uniform Comparative Fault Act and the 
Restatement 
States that are undecided or wish to change their methodology may 
look to the Uniform Comparative Fault Act or the Restatement of Torts 
for guidance in deciding whether to include intentional torts when 
comparing fault.120  The Uniform Comparative Fault Act is clear, stating, 
“[t]he Act does not include intentional torts.”121  Comparatively, the 
Restatement is less exclusive in its approach.122 
Recognizing the many issues inherent in including intentional torts 
in comparative fault, the Restatement deals cautiously with this issue.123  
                                                 
118 Id. at 1151.   In Jedrziewski, one evening thirty students from a local high school went to 
the home of the plaintiff looking for students of a rival high school in hopes of retaliating 
for a series of previous altercations between the two groups.  Id. at 1147.  After breaking 
several windows on the plaintiff’s house and chasing a number of students, the group 
caught up with the plaintiff and brutally beat him with baseball bats.  Id.  At the time the 
group caught up with the plaintiff, the plaintiff was involved in an altercation with a 
member of the group who had previously hit the plaintiff’s female friend in the face.  Id.  
119 See H.R. 45, 57th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2007) (proposing the inclusion of intentional 
torts into Utah’s comparative fault scheme).  Nevertheless, this Bill did not pass and its 
sponsor has since left the legislature. 
120 See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 (1977); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1. 
121 UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1, cmt. a (1977).  The Act defines “fault” as: 
[A]cts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless 
toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a 
person to strict tort liability.  The term also includes breach of 
warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an 
enforceable express consent, misuse of a product for which the 
defendant otherwise would be liable, and unreasonable failure to 
avoid an injury or to mitigate damages.  Legal requirements of causal 
relation apply both to fault as the basis for liability and to contributory 
fault. 
Id. at § 1(b). 
122 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1, cmt. c.; see also 
Ellen M. Bublick, supra note 111, at 435 (describing the restatement as it applies to 
intentional torts in comparative fault). 
123 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1, cmt. c.  The 
comment to §1 articulates very well the issues that are created by including intentional 
torts in comparison schemes: 
Whether intentional torts should be included raises two principal 
issues as well as some subordinate ones.  First, should a plaintiff’s 
negligence reduce the plaintiff’s recovery against an intentional 
tortfeasor?  Second, when one of two or more defendants is liable for 
an intentional tort, should a percentage of responsibility be assigned to 
that tortfeasor?  Such an allocation could affect: (a) the plaintiff’s own 
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For instance, it specifically states that it takes no position on whether to 
allow comparisons between a negligent plaintiff and a defendant who 
commits an intentional tort.124  But if the plaintiff also commits an 
intentional act, his fault may be compared to that of other intentional 
actors.125  Furthermore, the Restatement allows the fault of a negligent 
defendant to be compared with that of an intentional actor only when 
the former breached a special duty to protect the plaintiff from the injury 
caused by the intentional act.126  This concept is known as the “very 
duty” rule.127  Therefore, even though the Restatement includes 
intentional torts when comparing fault, it suggests a limited approach.128 
D. Public Policy Bases of Tort Law 
When analyzing any issue founded in tort law, it is crucial to 
recognize that this legal area has been shaped by “the pursuit of a variety 
                                                                                                             
percentage of responsibility and thereby reduce the plaintiff’s recovery 
against other defendants, including nonintentional tortfeasors, (b) 
whether to impose joint and several liability on various defendants, (c) 
the allocation of responsibility to other defendants, (d) whether a 
different defendant should bear liability for responsibility assigned to 
the intentional tortfeasor, (e) the rules governing settlement, and (f) 
contribution and indemnity. 
Id. 
124 Id.  The Restatement states that “[a]lthough some courts have held that a plaintiff’s 
negligence may serve as a comparative defense to an intentional tort, most have not.  This 
Restatement takes no position on that issue.”  Id. 
125 Id. 
126 See id. § 14; see also id. § 12 (stating that intentional tortfeasors are jointly and severally 
liable, even if joint and several liability has been abolished in a particular jurisdiction). 
127 See Bublick, supra note 111, at 423.  Describing this rule, Bublick states that “a 
negligent tortfeasor cannot reduce its liability to the plaintiff if it is liable for a ‘failure to 
protect the [plaintiff] from the specific risk of the intentional tort.’”  Id. (quoting the 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 14).  The very-duty rule is 
described well in the case of Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing, Corp., 290 A.2d 281 (N.J. 1972).  
In this case, the plaintiff lost his fingers after his hand was crushed by a push-press at 
work.  Id. at 282.  In rejecting the defendant’s claim that the plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the following: 
The asserted negligence of plaintiff—placing his hand under the ram 
while at the same time depressing the foot pedal—was the very 
eventuality the safety devices were designed to guard against.  It 
would be anomalous to hold that defendant has a duty to install safety 
devices but a breach of that duty results in no liability for the very 
injury the duty was meant to protect against.  We hold that under the 
facts presented to us in this case the defense of contributory negligence 
is unavailable. 
Id. at 286 (citations omitted).  Therefore, because the defendant’s duty was to manfacture 
this device to prevent the specific harm that the plaintiff suffered, the court denied the use 
of the defense of contributory negligence.  Id. 
128 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1, cmt. c. 
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of ends[.]”129  One goal already mentioned is the need to provide relief to 
injured plaintiffs.130  But other aims that tort law seeks to accomplish 
must also be considered in deciding whether intentional torts should be 
included in comparative fault analysis.  Vincent Johnson and Alan Gunn 
provide the following list of additional policy goals:131 
1. “Liability should be based on fault.”132 
2. “Liability should be proportional to fault.”133 
3. “Liability should be used to deter accidents.”134 
4. “The costs of accidents should be spread broadly.”135 
5. “The costs of accidents should be shifted to those best able to 
bear them.”136 
6. “Tort law should foster predictability in human affairs.”137 
                                                 
129 VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 4 (Carolina 
Academic Press 1994).  The authors continue by explaining that the many goals of tort law 
are “sometimes-congruent, sometimes-conflicting public policies.”  Id.  But understanding 
them helps to explain the rules of law and to evaluate “tort standards by clarifying the 
interests advanced or sacrificed through adherence to a given position.”  Id. 
130 See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text (discussing the priority of plaintiff 
recovery in the American tort law system). 
131 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 129, at 4–7.  Not discussed in this Note are four other 
policy goals also provided by Johnson and Gunn:  “Those who benefit from dangerous 
activities should bear the resulting losses[;]” “Tort law should facilitate economic growth 
and the pursuit of progress[;]” “Tort law should discourage the waste of resources[;]” and 
“Courts should accord due deference to co-equal branches of government.”  Id.  These 
policies deal with issues outside the scope of the topic of this Note, such as products 
liability or strict liability. 
132 Id. at 4 (internal quotations omitted).  This policy attempts to place liability on 
blameworthy conduct and is generally applied where harm is caused by a failure to 
exercise care or intentionally tortious conduct.  Id. 
133 Id.  This policy has two parts:  (1) liability should not be placed on an individual 
tortfeasor, even under the showing of fault, if the individual tortfeasor would be liable for a 
disproportionate burden; and (2) when two or more persons contributes to the harm, 
liability should be allocated among the tortfeasers in accordance with the degree to which 
their conduct caused the damage.  Id. 
134 Id. at 4–5.  According to this policy, tort law should function in such a way as to 
discourage individuals from engaging in conduct that carries with it excessive risk of 
personal injury or property damage.  Id. 
135 JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 129, at 5.  The goal of this policy is to favor situations 
where the financial burden imposed by liability can be spread broadly so that no person is 
forced to pay a large portion of the damages.  Id.  For example, in the case of a defective 
product, it is argued that liability should be placed on the manufacturer because it can 
distribute the loss to a large segment of the pubic by adjusting the price of its product.  Id. 
136 Id.  This policy seeks to shift liability in such a way that one with substantial resources 
bears the greater burden of the loss.  Id.  The rationale for this is that the impact of the 
liability will be less-severely felt by one with substantial resources than by one with limited 
wealth.  Id.  As a result, proponents of this principle would argue that an accident victim 
with $100 in assets should not have to bear a $100 loss, but rather should be able to shift 
that burden to a defendant with over a million dollars in assets.  Id. 
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7. “Tort law should be administratively convenient and efficient, 
and should avoid intractable inquiries.”138 
8. “Accident victims should be fully compensated.”139 
 
Part III applies the foregoing list of policies to the issues that arise 
when comparative fault is expanded to include intentional 
misconduct.140  By employing a policy-based approach, a deeper 
understanding of the effects of expanding comparative fault—
particularly a plaintiff’s ability to recover full and adequate 
compensation—may be achieved.141 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The American legal system has been described as an “aesthetic 
enterprise.”142  This characterization expands the definition of “aesthetic” 
beyond mere beauty and art to encompass a “description of those 
recurrent forms that shape the creation, apprehension, and identity of 
law.”143  One form is the dimension of doctrines and rules promulgated 
                                                                                                             
137 Id. at 5–6.  This policy may be used to support a variety of views, such as requiring 
tort law to provide clear notice of the type of conduct encouraged and prohibited, to carve 
out objective standards, rather than subjective, when applying tort principles, and to 
fashion bright-line rules when possible, rather than flexible guidelines that may make jury 
decisions difficult.  Id. at 6. 
138 Id.  The goal of this policy is to mold tort rules in such a way as to ensure efficient use 
of the money spent on accident compensation by creating legal standards that are not so 
complex or uncertain that the expending of judicial resources and litigation costs become 
unnecessary.  Id. 
139 Id. at 7.  Public policy demands that accident victims obtain the financial resources 
needed to overcome their injuries and, therefore, the goal of this principle is to encourage 
tort rules to be fashioned and applied in furtherance of these policy demands, even if it is at 
the expense of other tort policies, such as fault apportionment.  Id. 
140 See infra Part III.A (analyzing this issue by applying the Johnson and Gunn policy 
goals).  However, note that these policies often come into conflict with one another when 
applied to varying situations.  See Robert F. Blomquist, Re-enchanting Torts, 56 S. C. L. REV. 
481, 497–500 (2005); Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047 
(2002) (discussing public policies as the energy aesthetics that sometimes compete with one 
another). 
141 See infra Part III.B (arguing that the result of including intentional torts will be to 
return to the harsh realities of contributory negligence that prevented plaintiffs from fully 
recovering for their damages). 
142 Schlag, supra note 140, at 1049.  Describing this statement further, Schlag wrote, 
“B]efore the ethical dreams and political ambitions of law can even be articulated, let alone 
realized, the aesthetics of law have already shaped the medium within which those projects 
will have to do their work.”  Id.  See also Blomquist, supra note 140, at 490–505 (discussing 
Schlag’s characterization of the American legal system as an aesthetic enterprise). 
143 Schlag, supra note 140, at 1051.  In his article, Schlag describes four aesthetics of 
American tort law:  the grid aesthetic, the energy aesthetic, the perspective aesthetic, and 
the dissociative aesthetic.  Id. at 1051–52.  The grid aesthetic sees law as divided into 
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by courts and legislatures.144  Another is the realm entailing the 
principles, policies, and values advanced by these laws.145  Because 
“[p]recedents expand or contract in accordance with the push and pull of 
policy and principle[,]” Part III.A analyzes, in the context of Johnson and 
Gunn’s list of public policy goals, the inclusion of intentional torts when 
comparing fault.146  Afterward, Part III.B reviews the policy reasons that 
caused courts to move away from contributory negligence when 
developing comparative fault and examines whether including 
intentional torts furthers this aim.147 
A. A Policy-Based Approach to Deciding Whether to Include Intentional Torts 
When Comparing Fault 
Part II provided background for the many legal bases that courts 
have proffered for either including or not including intentional torts 
when comparing fault.148  In order to determine the practical 
consequences of each approach, Part III analyzes the arguments for and 
against inclusion, within the context of the policy goals that tort law 
seeks to advance.149  The discussion that follows entails all forms of 
intentional tort inclusion—whether between a plaintiff and defendant, or 
between joint defendants.150  Accordingly, Part III discusses the goal of 
tort law—to compensate injured victims, along with the other policy-
based goals of tort law provided by Johnson and Gunn, to set forth a 
                                                                                                             
doctrines and rules that are subdivided into elements that make up the bright-line rules, 
approaches, and definitions of the law.  Id. at 1051.  The energy aesthetic sees law as 
conflicting policies, principles, values, and politics that interact to shape our legal system.  
Id. at 1051–52.  The perspective aesthetic views law as shaping and changing in its identity 
in relation to point of view.  Id. at 1052.  Finally, the dissociative aesthetic is where the 
former three aesthetics collapse into one another rendering the law without determinable 
identities, relations, or perspectives.  Id. 
144 See id. 
145 See id. 
146 Id. at 1051–52; see also infra Part III.A (analyzing the policy goals of tort law provided 
by Johnson and Gunn). 
147 See infra Part III.B (describing the conceptual failure of allowing intentional torts to be 
included in comparative fault analysis). 
148 See supra Part II (providing a comprehensive background to the development of 
comparative fault and its expansion to include intentional torts by some states). 
149 See infra Parts III.A.1–6.  Note that in the interest of efficiency, some of these policies 
will be discussed in tandem with one another in this Note. 
150  See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text (describing the hypothetical situations of 
both types of comparisons when intentional torts are included in comparative fault). 
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framework for deciding whether states should include intentional torts 
in their comparative fault systems.151 
1. Liability Should Be Based on, and Be Proportional to, Fault 
The first two policy goals of tort law proposed by Johnson and Gunn 
are that liability should be both based on, and in proportion to, fault.152  
These goals prioritize the interests of defendants by seeking to ensure 
that they are not disproportionately liable for a plaintiff’s damages.153  As 
a result, the inclusion of intentional torts seems to greatly advance these 
two aims by holding all culpable parties accountable, regardless of the 
type of tortious act committed.154 
However, if “proportionate fault” is viewed not just as an issue of 
percentages but as a matter of moral culpability, then including 
intentional torts does not further these two policies.155  Some states argue 
that “[w]here society wants certain conduct absolutely prohibited and 
discouraged, apportionment of fault is not appropriate.”156  This 
contention relates back to the view that intentional torts are different in 
kind than negligent acts because they require a purposeful state of mind 
and warrant higher accountability.157  To compare the two, then, is 
“conceptually incoherent[.]”158 
                                                 
151 See supra notes 132–39 and accompanying text (listing the twelve tort-law policies set 
forth by Johnson and Gunn).  See also Geistfeld, supra note 17, at 585 (discussing the priority 
in tort law—to compensate victims). 
152 See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text (explaining that the goal of tort law is 
to have liability based on fault and to allocate it proportionally to one’s fault). 
153 See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text (describing the aims of these two goals 
in making defendants liable for their proportionate share of fault). 
154 See Ozaki v. Assoc. of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay, 954 P.2d 652 (Haw. Ct. 
App. 1998), rev’d in part on other grounds, 954 P.2d 644, 662 (Haw. 1998) (stating that 
including intentional torts accomplishes a fairer and more equitable result). 
155 Prosser and Keeton explained that the development of tort law has been shaped by 
the moral aspect of a defendant’s conduct.  KEETON ET AL, supra note 18, at 21.  The authors 
provided the following commentary: 
The oppressor, the perpetrator of outrage, the knave, the liar, the 
scandal-monger, the person who does spiteful harm for its own sake, 
the selfish aggressor who deliberately disregards and overrides the 
interests of neighbors, may expect to find that the courts of society, no 
less than the opinion of society itself, condemn the conduct. 
Id. 
156 Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168, 175–76 (Minn. 1986); see also supra note 87 
(discussing the opinion in Florenzano). 
157 See Parret v. Unicco Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572, 576 (Okla. 2005) (explaining the argument 
that intentional torts are different in kind, from negligence, and not just different in 
degrees); see also supra note 85 (discussing the Parret decision).  But see Westerbeke, supra 
note 87, at 189.  Westerbeke noted in his article that “not all intentional torts fit the ‘high 
culpability’ stereotype.”  Id. at 190.   Describing a situation where this would be the case, he 
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To illustrate, returning to the hypothetical situations in Part I, the 
rapist who committed a purposeful act of violence against the victim 
should not be allowed to shift any liability, even though the victim may 
have been negligent, because his act was far more egregious according to 
standards of morality.159  The same would be true in the hypothetical 
scenario also presented in Part I, involving joint defendants.160  The 
rapist who deliberately injured the victim should not be permitted to 
benefit by shifting liability to the owner of the property who merely 
failed to comply with a duty.161  When viewed in this light, inclusion of 
intentional torts does not further the goals of tort liability that suggest 
that liability should be based on, and in proportion to, fault.162 
2. Tort Law Should Deter Accidents 
Some critics have argued that the goal of deterring wrongful conduct 
is weakened when intentional torts are included in comparative fault 
analysis.163  Theoretically, where an individual knows that he cannot 
                                                                                                             
stated that a person may act under a reasonable but incorrect belief that he needs to use 
force to protect himself.  Id.  For example, a property owner might detain another whom 
the owner incorrectly believes stole his personal property.  Id.  The mistaken belief to use 
force may also arise when a person “resorts to force to defend himself in response to an 
unreasonable, but not malicious or reckless, belief in the need for such force.”  Id.  
Furthermore, “the acts of children, insane persons and others may meet the technical 
definition of intentional despite a virtual lack of any moral culpability.”  Id.  The situations 
described by Westerbeke are likely the exception rather than the rule.  Therefore, most 
cases of intentional misconduct will involve acts of higher moral culpability than 
negligence. 
158 Shin v. Sunriver Preparatory Sch., Inc., 111 P.3d 762, 776 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); see also 
supra note 84 (discussing the opinion in Shin). 
159 See supra Part I (presenting a hypothetical situation of a man raping a woman and 
trying to shift liability by claiming that she was negligent). 
160 See supra Part I (discussing a second hypothetical situation in which the plaintiff is not 
at fault, but where there are two defendants—one who committed the intentional act and 
one who acted negligently). 
161 Davies v. Butler, 602 P.2d 605, 611 (Nev. 1979) (stating that intentional tortfeasors 
should not be able to reap the benefits of comparative fault by reducing their own liability 
by the negligence of a joint defendant). 
162 See Poole v. City of Rolling Meadows, 656 N.E.2d 768, 771 (Ill. 1995) (holding that the 
plaintiff’s negligence could not be compared to the defendant’s intentional act because 
there is a “qualitative difference” between willful and wanton misconduct and simple 
negligence). 
163 See Wright, supra note 48, at 561.  Wright stated that “comparing the fault of 
intentional and negligent actors under a comparative fault approach leads to under-
accountability for the intentional actors, because an intentional wrongdoer’s fault can be 
reduced.”  Id.  Wright continued, “[i]f an actor intended the wrong, it is unfair to mitigate 
responsibility for the damages because the location of the intended event is poorly 
maintained.”  Id.  Therefore, Wright maintains that intentional tortfeasors will not be held 
properly accountable “if the consequences of an intentional act are reduced by another’s 
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shift liability under comparative fault to either the plaintiff or to another 
defendant, he will be less likely to commit an intentional harmful act.164  
Potential negligent actors will likewise be deterred because anticipating 
that liability may be shifted to an intentional tortfeasor eviscerates the 
negligent defendant’s duty to prevent harm.165 
Nevertheless, intentional misconduct can be deterred using other 
methods, even when intentional torts are included in comparative 
fault.166  The New Jersey Supreme Court determined in Blazovic that the 
punitive damage award was not subject to allocation and existed solely 
to punish the intentional tortfeasor.167  Many intentional acts, such as 
assault and battery, are subject to criminal sanctions.168  Therefore, the 
deterrence argument against including intentional torts seems to be 
weakened, at least with respect to intentional actors.169 
Negligent tortfeasors, on the other hand, will likely continue to be 
under-deterred if intentional misconduct is included in comparative 
fault analysis.170  In the hypothetical situation above, where the rapist 
and owner of the property are both at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries, if 
the owner knows that he can shift most of the liability to the rapist, he 
has less incentive to protect future victims from harm.171  Furthermore, 
                                                                                                             
negligent conduct.”  Id.  See also Davies, 602 P.2d at 611 (stating that intentional tortfeasors 
should not be able to benefit by shifting responsibility to others parties). 
164 See Wright, supra note 48, at 561. 
165 Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1088 (Utah 1998) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  Justice Stewart stated as follows: 
Given defendants’ duty to provide a safe workplace and their breach 
of that duty, it would be patently unfair to allow their liability to a 
faultless, injured plaintiff to be reduced or even eliminated by the 
culpability of an intentional wrongdoer, thereby depriving the faultless 
plaintiff of an adequate remedy or any remedy at all. 
Id.  He continued by admonishing, “[s]uch an application of comparative principles would 
eviscerate [the] defendant[’]s[] duty to prevent such a wrong.”  Id.  See also Brown & 
Morgan, supra note 88, at 510 (stating that if intentional torts are included in comparative 
schemes, “[t]he negligent defendant’s incentive to protect will be diminished because his 
amount of apportioned fault will likely be minimal.”). 
166 The other methods of deterring intentional misconduct include punitive damages and 
criminal sanctions.  See Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 231–32 (N.J. 1991). 
167 Id. 
168 For instance, intentional torts such as battery, assault, or false imprisonment are also 
considered criminal misconduct and are subject to prosecution in criminal courts. 
169 See Blazovic, 590 A.2d at 231–32; see also supra notes 101–08 and accompanying text 
(explaining the facts and holding in this opinion). 
170 Wright, supra note 48, at 561; see also supra note 163 (discussing how intentional 
tortfeasors become under-deterred when intentional torts are included). 
171 See supra Part I (discussing a second hypothetical situation in which the plaintiff is not 
at fault, but where there are two defendants—one who committed the intentional act and 
one who acted negligently); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  APPORTIONMENT OF 
LIABILITY § 14; Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing, Corp., 290 A.2d 281 (N.J. 1972).  This is the 
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unlike the rapist who can be punished with punitive damages and 
criminal liability, the owner is subject to no other sanctions.172  Therefore, 
including intentional torts fails to deter all potential tortfeasors, whereas 
not including them provides motivation for both negligent and 
intentional actors to refrain from tortious conduct.173 
3. The Costs of Accidents Should Be Spread Broadly and Shifted to 
Those Best Able to Bear Them 
Public policy also seeks to spread the costs of injuries broadly and to 
allocate such costs to those best able to bear them.174  The idea 
underlying this goal is that certain parties have more resources than 
others in the form of money, assets, and ability to shift their burden to a 
larger segment of the population.175  In a products liability case, for 
example, the manufacturer of the defective product is likely in the best 
position to assume the costs of liability because it is probably a company 
with monetary resources that can spread its burden to its customers by 
increasing the prices of its goods.176 
                                                                                                             
situation contemplated by the “very-duty rule” used to deter negligent defendants who fail 
in their duty to protect a plaintiff from the type of intentional harm giving rise to the 
plaintiff’s injuries. 
172 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 9–10 (stating that negligence is not enough to give 
rise to punitive damages).  Detailing what gives rise to an award of punitive damages, 
Prosser and Keeton stated that “[s]omething more than the mere commission of a tort is 
always required for punitive damages.”  Id. at 9.  In order to give rise to punitive damages, 
the circumstances must rise to something more akin to aggravation, outrage, spite, malice, 
or fraud.  Id.  The defendant must have “a fraudulent or evil motive” and must possess “a 
conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others[.]”  Id. (footnotes omitted).  
Furthermore, even though negligence can reach “gross” degrees, because negligence is not 
deliberate and wanton, it is not enough to constitute punitive damages.  Id. at 10. 
173 Brown & Morgan, supra note 88, at 511–12 (discussing that the duty to prevent harm 
will be diminished by including intentional torts). 
174 See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text (detailing these policy goals and the 
rationales behind their purposes). 
175 JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 129, at 5 (explaining the rationale behind this policy 
goal). 
176 See id.; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 24.  Speaking about such defendants’ 
ability to bear the loss, Keeton and Prosser stated as follows: 
This is not so much a matter of their respective wealth, although 
certainly juries, and sometimes judges, are not indisposed to favor the 
poor against the rich.  Rather it is a matter of their capacity to avoid the 
loss, or to absorb it, or to pass it along and distribute it in smaller 
portions among a larger group. 
Id.  The authors describe the defendants in many tort cases as “public utilities, industrial 
corporations, commercial enterprises, automobile owners, and others who by means of 
rates, prices, taxes or insurance are best able to distribute to the public at large the risks and 
losses which are inevitable in a complex civilization.”  Id. (footnote omitted). 
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Applying this reasoning to the hypothetical situation in Part I, 
involving the two defendants, the owner of the property is likely the 
party with the most money and greatest ability to spread its burden to a 
larger segment of the population.177  The rapist, on the other hand, could 
very well be insolvent or absent from the litigation because his identity is 
unknown.178  Therefore, if the victim brings a negligence claim against 
the owner and intentional torts are included when fault is compared, the 
owner will shift his liability to the rapist who cannot bear the costs of the 
plaintiff’s damages, thus leaving the victim without means of 
recovery.179  But if the owner cannot shift his liability to the rapist, he 
will assume the costs of damages and spread them broadly by increasing 
the prices of his goods, raising the rents of his tenants, or by other 
means.180  Including intentional torts when comparing fault results in an 
impediment both to spreading costs broadly and to spreading costs to 
those best able to bear them.181 
4. Tort Law Should Be Predictable, Efficient, and Convenient 
Another goal of tort law is to create a system with predictable and 
workable standards so that societal costs and judicial resources are not 
unnecessarily expended.182  Some commentators have argued that 
including intentional torts in comparative fault furthers this goal by 
making it so that judges do not have to determine whether an act was 
intentional or merely reckless in order to include it when allocating 
fault.183  Including intentional acts is said to clear up confusion and allow 
courts to operate more effectively.184 
                                                 
177 See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text (explaining this hypothetical situation). 
178 Speaking to cases where the intentional actor is insolvent or unknown, Prosser and 
Keeton stated that, “[r]ather than leave the loss on the shoulders of the individual plaintiff, 
who may be ruined by it, the courts have tended to find reasons to shift it to the 
defendants.”  KEETON ET AL., supra note 18, at 24.  In other words, courts traditionally 
negatively view denying a plaintiff means of recovery. 
179 See Brown & Morgan, supra note 88, at 511–12 (stating that “the policies of spreading 
the burden of loss and fairly compensating the injured plaintiff, which legislatures and 
courts sought to advance with the adoption of comparative fault, are undermined[ when 
intentional torts are included].”); see also Davies v. Butler, 602 P.2d 605, 611 (Nev. 1979) 
(stating that intentional tortfeasors should not be able to reap benefits of comparative fault 
by shifting any of their liability). 
180 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 129, at 5 (describing this result with respect to 
defendants such as manufacturers). 
181 See Brown & Morgan, supra note 88, at 511–12. 
182 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 129, at 5. 
183 Westerbeke, supra note 87, at 190–91 (stating that including intentional torts when 
comparing fault reduces confusion by making it so that judges do not have to classify an 
act as intentional or merely reckless).  For cases that have involved a combination of 
intentional and negligent torts, see, for example, Coffman v. Rohrman, 811 N.E.2d 868 (Ind. 
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However, including intentional torts creates uncertainty because it is 
applied in varying forms and degrees.185  Some states include intentional 
misconduct only when comparing the fault of joint defendants, whereas 
others include intentional misconduct when comparing fault between 
plaintiffs and defendants.186  Other states include intentional torts when 
comparing fault only if the negligent actor breached a special duty to 
protect the plaintiff from intentional harm, or when culpable parties are 
all named as defendants.187  Consequently, due to varying approaches 
among the states, intentional tortfeasors will not know to what degree 
they will be accountable, nor will negligent defendants understand the 
extent of their duties or their liability for breaching those duties.188  The 
                                                                                                             
2004) (comparing failure to disclose with intentional fraud); Landry v. Bellanger, 851 So.2d 
943 (La. 2003) (comparing the intentional battery at a bar fight with the negligence of the 
bar for not providing adequate security); Hanson v. Scott, 645 N.W.2d 223 (N.D. 2002) 
(comparing the intentional killing by the defendant with the Department of Criminal 
Justice’s negligence in not disclosing the defendant’s criminal background); Limbaugh v. 
Coffee Med. Ctr., 59 S.W.3d 73 (Tenn. 2001) (comparing an intentional assault on a resident 
of a nursing home with the nursing home’s failure to adequately supervise the assailant); 
Joseph v. State, 26 P.3d 459 (Alaska 2001) (comparing a decedent’s intentional suicide with 
the jail’s failure to properly supervise him); Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., 14 P.3d 1074 
(Idaho 2000) (comparing an employee’s intentional prank with the negligence of the 
employer’s lack of supervision); Hutcherson v. Phoenix, 961 P.2d 449 (Ariz. 1998) 
(comparing an intentional murder with the city’s 911 emergency operator’s failure to 
timely notify the police of impending danger); Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1998) 
(comparing the intentional physical and sexual assault on the plaintiff with the negligence 
of the owners of the mall on which the assault took place); Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 
222 (N.J. 1991) (comparing the plaintiff’s negligence in provoking a confrontation and the 
restaurant’s failure to provide adequate lighting and security, to the defendants’ intentional 
assault on the plaintiff); Ozaki v. Assoc. of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay, 954 P.2d 
652 (Haw. App. 1998) (comparing the intentional killing of the plaintiff’s daughter with the 
negligence of the apartment complex for allowing the killer to enter the decedent’s 
apartment); Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286 (Ky. App. Ct. 
1998) (comparing the intentional sexual assault of one defendant with the negligent hiring 
of the tortfeasor by the other defendant); and Comeau v. Lucas, 455 A.D.2d 674 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1982) (comparing an intentional assault with the negligence of both the plaintiff and 
the host of a party). 
184 Westerbeke, supra note 87, at 190–91. 
185 See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text (describing the different approaches 
throughout the states when comparing intentional torts in comparative fault schemes). 
186 See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (detailing the different approaches in 
several states that include intentional torts when comparing fault). 
187 See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (giving two examples of states that have 
adopted these more narrow approaches to comparing intentional fault). 
188 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 129, at 5–6 (stating that this policy exists so that 
persons are not forced to act at their own peril because they do not know what the law 
requires of them, and also stating that clear instruction should be provided as to what 
conduct is expected). 
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legal consequences of particular conduct thus become difficult to 
predict.189 
Furthermore, an efficient and convenient tort system accomplishes 
the task of compensating victims when they have suffered injuries.190  As 
demonstrated more fully in Part III.A.5, including intentional torts can 
significantly impede a plaintiff’s ability to recover from liable 
defendants.191  Suffice it to say that by including intentional torts in 
comparing fault, plaintiffs will often not receive full compensation for 
their injuries.192  Therefore, to include intentional torts in comparative 
fault gives rise to a less-efficient and unpredictable tort system.193 
5. Victims Should Be Fully Compensated for Their Damages 
Johnson and Gunn incorporate into their list of policy goals the need 
to compensate victims, which is one of tort law’s highest priorities.194  
                                                 
189 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 129, at 5.  The goal of this policy is to not create legal 
standards that are so complex or uncertain that costs and judicial resources are 
unnecessarily expended.  Id.  Including intentional torts can give rise to complexity and 
uncertainty in that some situations warrant allocation and others not, and also the fact that 
intentional actors will often times be absent from the litigation.  Id.  See also KEETON ET AL., 
supra note 18, at 23.  Moreover, as Prosser and Keeton stated: 
[i]t does not lie within the power of any judicial system to remedy all 
human wrongs.  The obvious limitations upon the time of the courts, 
the difficulty in many cases of ascertaining the real facts or of 
providing any effective remedy, have meant that there must be some 
selection of those more serious injuries which have the prior claim to 
redress and are dealt with most easily. 
Id.  As a practical matter, the ability to effectively administer the law may have to exist at 
the expense of other competing policies.  See id.  In comparative fault analysis, for instance, 
it may be necessary for complete fairness and accuracy in allocating fault to give way to 
administrative convenience and efficiency.  See id.  However, compare id. with Westerbeke, 
supra note 87, at 190–91 (discussing the confusion caused by excluding intentional torts). 
190 See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text (discussing scholars that maintain that 
tort law prioritizes plaintiff compensation). 
191 See infra Part III.A.5 (analyzing the policy in tort law of compensating victims for their 
injuries). 
192 See infra notes 220–24 and accompanying text (illustrating how plaintiffs are denied 
compensation when intentional torts are included in comparing fault). 
193 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 129, at 6 (stating that tort law discourages “the 
pursuit of what might be called intractable inquiries, matters where the facts are such that 
even after expenditure of considerable time and money, there is a substantial risk that an 
erroneous result will be reached.”). 
194 See supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing Johnson and Gunn’s description 
of this policy goal); see also Geistfeld, supra note 17, at 585 (describing the need to 
compensate plaintiffs as being one of the highest priorities in tort).   But see JOHNSON & 
GUNN, supra note 129, at 185–86 (illustrating how the goals of compensating victims and 
deterring tortious behavior conflict with one another).  In the context of a hypothetical case 
where a defendant causes the death of young children, Johnson and Gunn show how 
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Victims run a greater risk of not being fully compensated when 
intentional torts are included in comparative fault for two reasons.195  
First, including intentional torts allows the intentional actor to reduce his 
liability by the plaintiff’s negligence.196  Second, including intentional 
torts leaves victims without recourse because intentional actors are often 
insolvent or unknown.197  In the latter situation, the negligent defendant 
can shift his liability to the intentional actor and leave the plaintiff 
without recovery.198  The result of either of these situations is that the 
plaintiff becomes “victimized twice.”199 
                                                                                                             
prioritizing the goal of deterring tortious behavior above the goal of compensating victims, 
or vice versa, reaches different outcomes.  Id. at 186.  If the only goal were compensation of 
victims, the measure of damages would be nothing because, although the parents are heart-
broken, they lost nothing financially.  Id.  In fact, for the parents to receive compensation in 
such an instance would not make them whole and may even cause them to suffer 
emotional distress by knowing that they benefited from the death of a child.  Id.  If 
deterrence of tortious behavior is the priority, the death of these children should amount to 
very high damages because of the egregious nature of the harm caused.  Id.  Therefore, 
even though some commentators and scholars have maintained that compensating victims 
is the highest priority of tort law, there may be instances when it should yield to other 
priorities. See id. 
195 See Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1088 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (stating that including intentional torts in comparative fault “depriv[es] 
the faultless plaintiff of an adequate remedy or any remedy at all.”). 
196 See supra notes 101–08 and accompanying text (discussing the Blazovic case that 
permitted a group of defendants to reduce their liability to an amount equivalent to the 
plaintiff’s negligence). 
197 See Brown & Morgan, supra note 88, at 511–12 (stating that including intentional torts 
often results in plaintiffs not recovering because the defendants are insolvent or unknown).  
The authors of this article stated that in most cases, including intentional torts in a 
comparative fault and several liability jurisdiction will deny the plaintiff recovery.  Id.  In 
such a situation, the jury will apportion fault to the negligent and intentional defendants, 
with the greater amount of fault attributed to the intentional tortfeasor.  Id.  As a result, 
“[t]his effectively precludes the plaintiff from recovering for his injuries because the 
intentional tortfeasor will most likely be insolvent or unavailable.”  Id. at 511. 
198 This situation illustrates the ‘empty chair’ defense[.]”  See supra note 100 and 
accompanying text (discussing this concept).  Describing this defense, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court determined that, “an ‘empty chair’ defense is applicable when there is, or 
may be, a viable theory for assessing fault against a nonparty, i.e., a ‘person’ under [the 
statute], but for some reason that person is not a party to the lawsuit or recovery is not 
permitted against that person.”  Hanson v. Scott, 645 N.W.2d 223, 229 (N.D. 2002).  The 
obvious result of using this defense in jurisdictions that allow it is that a defendant can 
potentially reduce his liability by a great degree by shifting fault to an unidentifiable or 
immune contributor to the plaintiff’s damages.  By not allowing intentional torts to be 
compared to negligent torts, plaintiffs can recover their entire damages from a negligent 
actor. 
199 See E-mail from Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at the Law Offices of Phillip W. Dyer in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, to Senator Ross I. Romero, Utah Legislator (February 5, 2007, 5:58 p.m. 
MST) (on file with author).  In lobbying the Utah Legislature to exclude intentional acts 
from the comparative fault statute, members of the Utah Trial Lawyers Association have 
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In states that do not include intentional torts, however, the negligent 
defendant can be liable for the entire amount of the victim’s damages.200  
This provides the plaintiff with a known and solvent party through 
whom he can be compensated.201  Critics of this result argue that it gives 
rise to over-accountability for negligent defendants.202  In response to 
this contention Ellen M. Bublick has stated: 
[S]light negligence can produce great harm and, 
therefore, great liability.  But tort law is designed to 
provide compensation for wrongful injuries, and until 
some rule of nature prevents plaintiffs from being 
injured out of proportion to defendant’s fault, 
compensation to injured plaintiffs must continue to be 
based on the actual harm caused by that fault.203 
In other words, the high priority of a victim’s need to be 
compensated for all harm caused outweighs the unfairness created by 
holding a culpable defendant accountable for more than his proportional 
share of the fault.204  Therefore, in the interest of advancing the goal to 
compensate injured victims, states should not include intentional torts in 
their comparative fault systems. 
                                                                                                             
stated that including intentional torts “will produce a fundamentally unsound result—
victims of otherwise preventable [tortious] misconduct will be victimized a ‘second 
time’. . . inasmuch as the [intentional tortfeasor] will not be brought to justice and the 
victim will be deprived of compensation because that [tortfeasor] escaped justice!”  Id.  
Moreover, Justice Stewart of the Utah Supreme Court argued the same when he eloquently 
provided the following commentary: 
Given defendants’ duty to provide a safe workplace and their breach 
of that duty, it would be patently unfair to allow their liability to a 
faultless, injured plaintiff to be reduced or even eliminated by the 
culpability of an intentional wrongdoer, thereby depriving the faultless 
plaintiff of an adequate remedy or any remedy at all. 
Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1088 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
200 See Brandon v. County of Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604, 628 (Neb. 2001) (holding the 
county liable for all of the damages caused by the murderers of the plaintiff’s daughter). 
201 See supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing the need for this policy and how 
it furthers a system of tort law). 
202 See Ozaki v. Assoc. of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay, 954 P.2d 652, 662 (Haw. 
App. 1998) (reasoning that including intentional torts in comparative fault accomplishes “a 
fairer and more equitable result[]”). 
203 Bublick, supra note 111, at 435. 
204 Id. at 437–38.  However, in her article, Bublick suggests that the issue of inadequate 
victim recovery inherent in including intentional torts can be remedied by expanding 
victim compensation programs.  Id. at 437.  Bublick also recommends that legislatures 
rethink laws that bar insurance coverage for intentional torts.  Id.  As a result, these 
suggestions could provide other avenues for plaintiff recovery.  See id. 
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Tort law places great emphasis on this policy of compensating 
victims.205  To more fairly pay damages to injured plaintiffs was the 
reason courts moved away from common law contributory negligence.206  
As a result, a tort system that fails to adequately provide relief may be 
said to wane in its utility for a civilized society.207  In Part III.B, this 
concern is developed further with respect to the consequences of 
including intentional torts in comparative fault analysis.208 
B. Rethinking the Conceptual Failure of the All-or-Nothing Approach to 
Apportioning Fault 
The doctrine of contributory negligence created by Butterfield was a 
system of all-or-nothing.209  After this decision, plaintiffs who were free 
from fault received full compensation,210 but plaintiffs who contributed 
to their injuries in any way recovered no percentage of their damages.211  
Lou Dobbs characterized this harsh consequence as a “conceptual 
failure” on the part of nineteenth-century judges.212 
If a modern court applying comparative fault instead of contributory 
negligence was to decide the case in Butterfield, the result would be 
undoubtedly different.213  Depending on the comparative fault system 
adopted, such a court would likely apportion a certain amount of the 
liability to the plaintiff who rode his horse too fast and the remaining 
liability to the defendant who left the obstruction in the road.214  The 
                                                 
205 See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text (discussing one of the main priorities of 
tort law:  to provide relief to injured victims). 
206 See Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 226 (N.J. 1991) (stating that the legislative 
decision to adopt comparative negligence was aimed at ameliorating the harsh results of 
contributory negligence). 
207 See infra notes 16–17 and accompanying text (discussing the Restatement and other 
authorities that state that one of the primary functions of tort law is to provide 
compensation to accident victims). 
208 See infra Part III.B. 
209 See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text (discussing Butterfield and its holding). 
210 See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of contributory 
negligence). 
211 See supra notes 42 and accompanying text (discussing the harsh results of contributory 
negligence). 
212 DOBBS, supra note 31, at 234; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing 
Dobb’s analysis in more detail). 
213 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text (explaining the holding and reasoning in 
Butterfield). 
214 See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text (giving the facts of this case).  Of course, 
under different systems, such as the forty-nine percent system, the plaintiff could still stand 
to recover nothing if the jury found his fault to be equal to or greater than that of the 
defendants.  See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text (discussing modified systems of 
comparative fault).  Or, under the slight-gross system, if the court decided that the 
plaintiff’s negligence was gross, he would also recover nothing.  See supra notes 53–55 and 
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plaintiff would then be able to recover at least a percentage of his 
damages.215  For the plaintiff, this outcome is far more equitable than 
receiving no compensation at all merely because the plaintiff was riding 
his horse too fast and, thus, caused a slight percentage of his own 
injury.216 
In order to fulfill comparative fault’s goal of ameliorating the harsh 
results of contributory negligence, any system of fault apportionment 
adopted by a state must adequately compensate injured plaintiffs.217  If a 
state’s comparative fault system fails in this task and renders plaintiffs 
without relief, it returns to the stringent all-or-nothing system that 
comparative fault eviscerated.218  Stated another way, if including 
intentional torts when comparing fault produces harsh results for 
plaintiffs, then adopting that approach amounts to a “conceptual 
failure.”219 
When intentional torts are included in comparative fault, injured 
plaintiffs will suffer severe consequences because they will not be fairly 
compensated.220  In the context of joint defendants, the negligent 
defendant will be able to shift a greater portion of liability to the 
unknown or insolvent intentional tortfeasor and deny the plaintiff 
adequate recovery.221  The result is also harsh when a defendant who 
intentionally injures the plaintiff is able to reduce his liability by the 
plaintiff’s negligence because of the moral disparity between the two 
types of conduct.222  Returning to Justice Stewart’s dissent in the Utah 
Supreme Court decision of Field v. Boyer Co., this differentiation is 
                                                                                                             
accompanying text (discussing the slight-gross system of comparative fault).  Nevertheless, 
regardless of which system is implemented, the plaintiff will have a more equitable chance 
of recovery than if contributory negligence is employed. 
215 See supra notes 46–55 and accompanying text (discussing the different approaches to 
comparative fault in the United States). 
216 See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing the harsh results of contributory 
negligence). 
217 See Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 226 (N.J. 1991) (stating that the adoption of 
comparative negligence was aimed at ameliorating the harsh results of contributory 
negligence). 
218 See supra notes 42–58 and accompanying text (discussing the all-or-nothing approach 
of comparative fault and tort law’s development beyond that doctrine). 
219 DOBBS, supra note 31, at 234; see also supra notes 43 and accompanying text (discussing 
Dobb’s characterization of contributory negligence as a conceptual failure). 
220 See supra notes 195–99 and accompanying text (describing how plaintiffs are denied 
compensation when intentional torts are included in comparative fault analysis). 
221 See supra note 197 and accompanying text (explaining that the archetypical situation 
involves an intentional tortfeasor who is insolvent or absent). 
222 See supra note 85 and accompanying text (describing states that do not include 
intentional torts based on the differences in moral degrees and accountability of negligence 
and intentional conduct). 
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described by Justice Stewart when he discussed the plurality’s opinion 
and stated: 
Chief Justice Zimmerman says that where a plaintiff 
sues a defendant for assault, battery, conversion, libel, or 
any other intentional tort, the law countenances a 
shifting of liability to the victim of the tort because the 
victim may have been careless.  Put more concretely, his 
position is that a man sued for rape could reduce his 
liability for the injury he caused because the woman 
invited the rape by her failure to take reasonable 
precautions for her own safety.  The same principle 
dictates that a person who steals another’s property can 
reduce his liability because the victim failed to take 
sufficient precautions to protect his property.  Chief 
Justice Zimmerman’s view turns both morality and the 
law on their heads.  The [Utah] Legislature never 
intended such an absurd result.223 
Because of the deliberate nature of intentional acts, any system that 
allows an intentionally tortfeasing defendant to reduce his liability by 
the victim’s negligence results in inequitable compensation for that 
victim.224 
The foregoing analysis of the inclusion of intentional torts in the 
context of Johnson and Gunn’s tort policy goals, coupled with the fact 
that the American tort system assigns a high priority to plaintiff 
compensation and actually moved away from contributory negligence to 
further that goal, leads to the conclusion that intentional torts should not 
be included in comparative fault analysis.225  When they are included, 
the aims of tort law are compromised and cease to be accomplished.226  
Furthermore, the results on victims are too harsh because they will often 
be denied equitable compensation for their injuries.227  States will better 
fulfill the objectives of tort law by not including intentional torts when 
comparing the fault of culpable parties. 
                                                 
223 Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1998) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
224  Id. 
225 See supra Parts III.A–B (using the framework of policy goals to analyze whether 
intentional torts should be included in comparative fault analysis). 
226 See supra Parts III.A.1–5 (analyzing the inclusion of intentional torts by applying a 
number of policy goals). 
227 See supra Part III.B (discussing that including intentional torts produces harsh results 
for plaintiffs). 
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IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
In light of the foregoing contention that intentional torts should not 
be included in comparative fault analysis, legislatures should draft laws 
that draw distinct lines between negligent and intentional misconduct.  
Even though most states continue to exclude intentional torts from 
comparative fault, many do not set forth explicit divisions between 
negligent and intentional misconduct in their statutes.228  The following 
amendments and propositions to Utah’s comparative fault statute 
illustrate how such divisions may be accomplished.229 
§ 78-27-37:  Definitions 
. . . (2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or 
omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages 
sustained by a person seeking recovery, including negligence in all its 
degrees, comparative negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, 
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, 
and misuse, modification, or abuse of a product.  “Fault” does not mean 
intentional or willful acts under this section.  “Fault” means an intentional or 
willful act only under section 78-27-38A. 
Comment 
The amendments to § 78-27-37 are to make clear that under this section 
intentional torts are excluded from the definition of fault.  Only under the 
specific instance described in section 78-27-38A can an intentional act be 
included in a definition of fault.  Nevertheless, under no circumstances can 
negligent-type acts be compared to intentional or willful misconduct when 
allocating fault under this statute.230 
§ 78-27-38:  Comparative Negligence 
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery may not alone bar 
recovery by that person. 
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from any defendant or 
group of defendants whose fault, combined with the fault of persons 
immune from suit and nonparties to whom fault is allocated, exceeds the 
fault of the person seeking recovery prior to any reallocation of fault 
made under subsection 78-27-39(2). 
                                                 
228 See supra note 77 and accompanying text (listing the states that do not include 
intentional torts when comparing fault). 
229 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 et seq.  The contributions by the author of this Note 
are italicized to distinguish them from the original text of the statute.  See id. 
230 See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text (listing decisions in most states that 
decided this issue under statutes that were not very clear as to whether or not intentional 
torts were included in comparative fault). 
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(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any 
amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to that defendant 
under section 78-27-39. 
(4)(a) The fact finder may, and when requested by a party shall, 
allocate the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person 
seeking recovery, to each defendant, to any person immune from suit, 
and to any other person identified under subsection 78-27-41(4) for 
whom there is a factual and legal basis to allocate fault.  However, when 
the cause of action is based on fault as defined in section 78-27-38(b), fault 
cannot be allocated to any party who acts intentionally.  Intentional torts can 
only be allocated under the circumstances described in section 78-27-38A.231  In 
the case of a motor vehicle accident involving an unidentified motor 
vehicle, the existence of the vehicle shall be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence which may consist solely of one person's testimony. 
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune from suit is considered 
only to accurately determine the fault of the person seeking recovery 
from a defendant and may not subject the person immune from suit to 
any liability, based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action. 
Comment 
This section applies exclusively to causes of action based on fault as defined 
in subsection 78-27-37(b).  The 78-27-37(b) fault can properly be described as 
“negligent-type” conduct that includes products liability and strict liability.  
The important distinction is that these acts do not require a willful state of 
mind.  Intentional or willful torts, on the other hand, are not included under 
this section and can only be compared with other intentional or willful acts as 
described in section 78-27-38A.  The amendments to this section are to make 
clear that if a plaintiff brings a negligence claim for an injury that resulted from 
an intentional act, but was also caused by a breach of duty, then the negligent 
defendant cannot shift liability based on the fault of the intentional actor.  
Conversely, if a plaintiff brings a claim alleging an intentional tort against a 
defendant, that defendant cannot shift liability based on the fault of a negligent 
actor.   
Furthermore, these amendments make clear that the fault of an intentional 
actor can never be reduced by the fault of a negligent plaintiff.  A fact finder 
may include the fault of an intentional actor only when all the tortfeasors are 
found to have acted intentionally as described in section 78-27-38A. 
                                                 
231 See supra Part III (describing the unfortunate consequences of allowing intentional 
torts to be included when fault is compared). 
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§ 78-27-38A:  Comparative Intentional Fault 
(1) “Fault” under this section includes only intentional torts and applies 
only when all allocated fault is based on intentional or willful misconduct.  
“Fault” as defined under subsection 78-27-37(b) is not included in this section. 
(2) A defendant who is found to have acted intentionally or willfully in 
causing harm to a plaintiff, or whose intentional or willful act was a substantial 
factor in causing harm to the plaintiff, may be jointly and severally liable for his 
or her portion of the damages only in comparison to one or more defendants who 
are also found to have acted intentionally.  The fault of an intentional tortfeasor 
defendant cannot be compared with the fault of another defendant as defined in 
subsection 78-27-37(b).232 
Comment 
This section is to make clear that intentional torts are to be compared within 
their own sphere of liability and not to be mixed with other forms of fault.  If a 
plaintiff is bringing a claim based on an intentional act, then any allocation of 
fault is subject to this section within the confines of intentional tort analysis.  In 
other words, this section seeks to create two spheres of comparing fault:  one 
between intentional acts and the other between negligent-type conduct. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The creation of contributory negligence in the Nineteenth Century 
was radical and had detrimental affects on a plaintiff’s ability to recover 
damages.  In its wake, courts have extracted the progressive idea of 
comparing fault and developed it into the more equitable apportionment 
systems utilized today.  But expanding comparative fault to include 
intentional torts results in a return to the harshness that contributory 
negligence wrought upon plaintiffs.  By including intentional torts in 
comparative fault analysis, plaintiffs are denied fair and just 
compensation and are forced to suffer because the aims of tort law 
cannot be accomplished. 
Returning to the first hypothetical situation presented in Part I, if the 
rapist’s intentional fault is reduced by the victim’s negligence, the victim 
is not equitably compensated.  A willful and intentional act, such as 
committing rape, carries a higher moral culpability than the victim 
merely failing to take precautions or wearing suggestive clothing.  
Moreover, to permit the rapist to shift liability to the victim results in 
legitimizing the violent act and forcing the victim to defend in court 
something that she did.  This results in a tort system that does not 
provide justice proportional to fault, nor would it adequately deter 
                                                 
232 See H.R. 45, 57th Leg., Gen.F Sess. (Utah 2007) (suggesting similar language as this 
proposed amendment to Utah’s Comparative Fault Statute). 
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intentional misconduct, create efficient and predictable standards, or 
adequately compensate the victim for her injuries. 
Likewise, in the second hypothetical scenario presented in Part I, if 
the rapist or the owner is permitted to shift liability to the other, the aims 
of tort law are not accomplished and the victim is denied compensation.  
First, the rapist and the owner are under-deterred by knowing that they 
can reduce liability by the others’ fault.  Second, this situation results in 
unpredictable and inefficient standards because the rapist does not know 
to what degree he will be accountable, nor does the owner understand 
the extent of his duties or of his liability for breaching those duties.  
Third, if the owner is permitted to shift his liability to the rapist, the costs 
of compensating the victim are not spread broadly or allocated to the 
party best able to bear them.  Finally, when the rapist is unknown or 
insolvent, the victim is left without compensation because the owner 
attributes the greatest proportion of fault to the rapist. 
In short, states should maintain clear distinctions between acts that 
are negligent and acts that are intentional when comparing fault.  By so 
doing, the primary aims of tort law may be maximized in their utility for 
the benefit of American societies. 
J. Tayler Fox∗ 
                                                 
∗ J.D., Valparaiso University School of Law (2008); M.A., Liberal Studies, emphasis in 
English (2007), Sigma Tau Delta English Honor Society; B.A., Political Science, University 
of Utah (2002).  I wish to acknowledge and thank Morgan Fife for bringing this issue to my 
attention, Dean Bruce Berner for his guidance and counsel on this subject, Chad Wade for 
his tireless editing and assistance, and the entire Valparaiso University Law Review 
Editorial Board.  But most importantly, I thank my family—Sarah, Addy, Miles, and Jesse. 
Fox: Can Apples Be Compared to Oranges? A Policy-Based Approach for De
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
